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Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections
REBECCA GREEN*
Bush v. Gore catapulted this country into a crisis of confidence in the
management of our elections. Despite reforms since 2000, public confidence in
election administration continues to wane. Are dead people on the rolls? Are
noncitizens voting? Are provisional ballots wrongly rejected? State election
transparency statutes meant to reassure the public that elections are producing
legitimate results are often conflicting, vague, and even nonexistent.
Exacerbating the problem, the last two decades have witnessed huge changes
that offset the transparency balance. Dramatic changes in how Americans
vote, how elections are administered, and who scrutinizes the election process
call for a recalibration of election transparency norms. It is not immediately
clear, as some are beginning to sense, that unqualified openness serves the
fundamental goals of election transparency, that reactive access policies boost
public confidence, or that current state transparency architectures tap the full
potential technology offers. Circumstances demand not just statutory revision,
but revisiting traditional assumptions about election transparency to
accommodate radically changed circumstances. This paper contains a
proposal pairing an increase in public access to election materials with
penalties for harmful uses of election data. We have an opportunity to craft a
modern transparency regime trained on the core goal of ensuring public
confidence in election outcomes. Developing state transparency regimes that
address—and take advantage of—modern realities is critical in an era when
election controversy is the new normal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the initial tally in Virginia’s 2013 election for attorney general,
Republican Mark D. Obenshain trailed Democrat Mark R. Herring by seventeen
votes out of 2.2 million cast—one of the closest statewide races in U.S. history.
During the canvas, representatives of the Herring campaign huddled at the
Fairfax County Clerk’s office taking pictures of lists of provisional voters with
their cell phones. The clerk, unsure of whether such lists could be made public
and if so to whom and in what form, looked nervously on. The campaign
wanted to record which voters had cast provisional ballots to help ensure
Herring provisional votes counted. But, as in many states, Virginia’s state and
local rules are silent on whether the names of provisional voters may be
released.1 The answer mattered: the outcome of the race could well have hinged
on provisional votes. And the race mattered. After his win (by 810 votes at the
time Obenshain conceded), Herring refused to defend the state’s same-sex
marriage ban, surely contributing to a federal judge’s decision to overturn it just
weeks after Herring took office.2
This example is one of many recent incidents that expose an election
transparency regime terribly out of date. Transparency in elections is a key
pillar of a functioning democracy.3 Since the founding of this country, those
who run elections have understood that democratic legitimacy depends on
1 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-653 (2014) (permitting “[o]ne authorized representative of
each political party or independent candidate in a general or special election or one
authorized representative of each candidate in a primary election . . . to remain in the room
in which the determination [of the eligibility of a provisional voter] is being made as an
observer so long as he does not participate in the proceedings and does not impede the
orderly conduct of the determination. Each authorized representative shall be a qualified
voter of any jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. Each representative, who is not himself a
candidate or party chairman, shall present to the electoral board a written statement
designating him to be a representative of the party or candidate and signed by the county or
city chairman of his political party, the independent candidate, or the primary candidate, as
appropriate.”). Later, the Chief Judge for the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond
instructed in his December 10, 2013 Recount Procedural Order that representatives of the
candidates be given access to records regarding decisions on the eligibility of provisional
voters but prohibited public dissemination of this information. Recount Procedural Order at
1–3, Obenshain v. Herring, No. CL13-5272 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/releases/recountproceduralorder.pdf.
2 See Markus Schmidt, Ruling Sparks Renewed Debate over Same-Sex Marriage,
TIMES
DISPATCH
(Feb.
14,
2014,
12:00
AM),
RICHMOND
http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/virginia-politics/ruling-sparks-reneweddebate-over-same-sex-marriage/article_15548c64-0f56-5a22-b2f0-37510816c1c0.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/U2J8-7ZKG.
3 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS ix (2012) (“A lack of faith in elections
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines faith in democratic governance itself.”).
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public confidence in the conduct of elections.4 Today, from federal transparency
requirements for voter registration forms,5 to poll watcher and recount observer
statutes,6 to voting machine audit requirements,7 our system routinely
acknowledges transparency as a core value in ensuring the legitimacy of
electoral outcomes.8 But history demonstrates transparency must be carefully
calibrated; greater transparency does not always lead to greater legitimacy. The
most obvious example is the shift to secret ballot in the late nineteenth century,
a form of voting adopted to restore public confidence in elections after decades
of debauchery at the polls. History teaches that too much transparency in the
voting process carries risk and undermines the legitimacy of outcomes.9
Our democracy has walked the transparency tightrope for hundreds of
years. In the last two decades, however, several currents dramatically offset the
balance. First, we are witnessing enormous changes in voting. Today, fewer and
fewer Americans cast traditional ballots due in part to significant increases in
early, mail-in, and provisional voting. Second, new technologies have
transformed how states interface with the public, how voters cast ballots, and
how election officials collect, store, and disseminate election data. The
digitization of elections fundamentally changes the election transparency
landscape. And third, since Bush v. Gore, the days when political party and
candidate representatives served as the principal watchdogs of elections are
4 Cortlandt F. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies, in 3 STUDIES IN
HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 1, 186 (New York, Columbia College 1893)
(explaining as a transparency measure, many colonies and towns would offer a copy of the
polls to anyone who would pay for them so they could look through and check votes); see
infra Part II.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1)–(2) (2012) (requiring that each state maintain for two
years, and make available for public inspection at reasonable cost, voter registration
records).
6 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §101.131 (West 2014) (allowing each political party,
candidate, or ballot measure advocate one poll watcher at the polls); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3501.35, 3505.21 (West 2012) (permitting watchers to include those selected by political
parties, those selected by candidates themselves, watchers selected by the state, and
requiring watchers to take an oath); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604 (2014) (watchers can
include those selected by political parties, those selected by candidates themselves, or
selected by the state; watchers must be registered voters in the county; provisions for news
media observation).
7 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic
Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1722 (2005) (discussing problems associated with
assuring an accurate count with new voting technology).
8 Note that this paper narrows its scope to election administration transparency only.
Campaign finance transparency falls outside its scope.
9 R. Michael Alvarez et al., Are Americans Confident Their Ballots are Counted?, 70
J. POL. 754, 764 (2008) (finding a relationship between voter familiarity with voting
technology and confidence in the electoral process); Raymond J. La Raja, Political
Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency on Making Small
BEHAV.
(Oct.
29, 2013), available at
Campaign Contributions, POL.
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/.

782

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:4

fading quickly.10 Election integrity advocates, voting rights activists, and
members of both the citizen media and traditional media scrutinize election
materials at levels and in ways not previously possible.11
Amidst this series of cultural and technological changes, state election
transparency statutes offer confused guidance; transparency statutes are often
dated, inconsistent, underinclusive, and even absent. Circumstances demand not
just statutory revision, but revisiting traditional assumptions about election
transparency to accommodate radically changed circumstances. It is not
immediately clear, as some scholars are beginning to sense, 12 that total and
unqualified openness serves the fundamental goals of election transparency, that
reactive access policies boost public confidence, or that current policies tap the
full potential of election data. Policymakers have an opportunity to craft a
modern transparency regime trained on the core goal of ensuring public
confidence in election outcomes. Developing state transparency regimes that
address modern realities is critical, particularly in an era when election
controversy has begun to feel like the new normal.13
Election transparency is a broad topic. Much has been written about it,
particularly in the area of campaign finance and the extent to which political
spending should be made public.14 Some scholars have tackled the question of
transparency in election administration with the bulk of the work focused on
improving election administration through better recordkeeping and
performance data creation and analysis.15 Quite a lot has also been written about
transparency in the age of electronic voting and the auditability of voting
machines.16 Virtually all of the work done to date on election-administration
10 See Gilda R. Daniels, Outsourcing Democracy: Redefining Public-Private
Partnerships in Election Administration, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2010) (noting the
rise of private election watchdog groups since 2000).
11 Following the 2013 Supreme Court’s decision to strike the coverage formula
undergirding Voting Rights Act preclearance provisions, citizen oversight efforts are likely
to ramp up. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013); see Cody Gray, Savior
Through Severance: A Litigation-Based Response to Shelby County v. Holder, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing for expanded federal observation under the
Voting Rights Act).
12 See, e.g., E. Scott Adler & Thad E. Hall, Ballots, Transparency, and Democracy, 12
ELECTION L.J. 146, 147 (2013) (arguing against public access to voted ballots).
13 Election litigation in this country has more than doubled since Bush v. Gore in 2000.
See HASEN, supra note 3, at 134.
14 E.g., Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 987 (2011); Michael
D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1847, 1849 (2013); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 559 (2012).
15 E.g., R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, LONNA RAE ATKESON & THAD E. HALL, EVALUATING
ELECTIONS 12–14 (2013); HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 5–6 (2009).
16 E.g., Tokaji, supra note 7, at 1722; R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, IBM
CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, THE NEXT BIG ELECTION CHALLENGE: DEVELOPING
ELECTRONIC DATA TRANSACTION STANDARDS FOR ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (2005).
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transparency assumes that transparency is an unqualified good; the more
transparency in our elections the better. This Article will step back to test basic
truths about transparency in elections and demonstrate the need to adapt rules to
changed circumstances. It asks, given modern realities, whether states should
constrict election transparency or whether access should be broadened, and, if
so, how and with what accompanying protections.
This Article proceeds in three parts. The first establishes the central goal of
election transparency and how election administrators have adapted processes
throughout American history in pursuit of it. The next section documents three
fundamental shifts and the failure of current transparency policies to adequately
address them. The final section proposes election transparency reform to ensure
that dated transparency rules do not undermine already-fragile public faith in
our system of elections.

II. ELECTION TRANSPARENCY AND ADAPTATION
Transparency in elections is different than transparency in other
administrative settings. Just as the right to vote is hailed as preservative of all
other rights, 17 so too is election transparency preservative of all other forms of
government transparency. Without the public confidence in election outcomes
transparency enables, no legitimate government could form.
It is true that election transparency serves goals similar to transparency in
other administrative settings: promoting accountability, enabling an informed
citizenry, protecting citizens against arbitrary and capricious state action, and
exposing mistake or fraud.18 Election transparency can also increase efficiency
in election administration.19 But administrative transparency in elections serves
an additional—and critical—function that sets it apart from administrative
transparency in other realms. Like courts, for which transparency’s key goal is
to enhance the public’s perception of just legal outcomes,20 a critical function of
17 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (“Long ago in Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, the Court referred to ‘the political franchise of voting’ as a
‘fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.’”).
18 Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006) (“By
any commonsense estimation, governmental transparency, defined broadly as a governing
institution’s openness to the gaze of others, is clearly among the pantheon of great political
virtues.”). Two of the most commonly cited goals of government transparency in liberal
democratic theory are to enable both an informed citizenry and official accountability,
central ingredients of the democratic project. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Essay on
Political Tactics, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 551 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh,
William Tait 1843); JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 80–89 (Henry Regnery Co. 1962) (1861).
19 Professor Heather Gerken makes the convincing argument, discussed infra at Part
IV.B, that the more data we have about election administration, the easier it will be to
identify problems and solutions. GERKEN, supra note 15, at 59–61.
20 Though not acknowledged as a First Amendment right until Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the American judicial system and its British precursor
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administrative transparency in elections is ensuring public confidence in
electoral outcomes. For elections to achieve their intended purpose, the peaceful
transfer of power, the public must believe that outcomes reflect the true will of
the people. Without this perception, legitimate government cannot function and
all other forms of government transparency are for naught. Administrative
transparency in elections is thus a precondition for all other forms of
government transparency.
Recognizing that the fundamental goal of transparency in elections is
ensuring public confidence in outcomes, election administrators since the
founding of this country have understood that more transparency does not
necessarily equal a better process. Election designers have calibrated the extent
to which the public could see for itself various portions of the election process
depending upon a variety of historical, demographic, and technological
conditions underpinning the conduct of elections.21 Election administrators
intuitively understood that election processes could not be conducted entirely in
the dark without some measure of public oversight.22 Likewise, election
designers also recognized that too much transparency might undermine the
result.
Perhaps the best example of election-legitimizing transparency measures in
early U.S. elections was the common practice of casting votes by speaking the
name of the preferred candidate out loud, a process known as viva voce voting.
After voicing one’s vote, custom had it that the candidate would bow and thank
the voter as partisan onlookers applauded.23 In jurisdictions using paper

has long recognized the value of open courts in assuring just outcomes and public
acceptance of judicial verdicts. Id. at 566 (“[T]he King's will was that all evil doers should
be punished after their deserts, and that justice should be ministered indifferently to rich as
to poor; and for the better accomplishing of this, he prayed the community of the county by
their attendance there to lend him their aid in the establishing of a happy and certain peace
that should be both for the honour of the realm and for their own welfare.”) (citations
omitted)).
21 See generally Adler & Hall, supra note 12.
22 Early examples include the New Hampshire constitution of 1792 which required that
a moderator receive votes in an open town meeting who would then, “count them and make
a public declaration thereof” and the Massachusetts constitution which required that,
“persons qualified to vote shall give in their votes for Governor to the Selectmen, who shall
preside at such meetings; and the town-clerk, in the presence and with the assistance of the
Selectmen shall, in open town meeting, sort and count the votes, and form a list of the
persons voted for, with the number of votes for each person, against his name; and shall
make a fair record of the same in the town books.” In Virginia, a 1785 statute dictated that
each “writer” at the polls would be given a poll book with the name of each candidate at the
head of a column. “As each elector named his preferred candidate his name was written in
the column of that candidate,” thereby creating a written, transparent record of who voted for
whom. SPENCER D. ALBRIGHT, THE AMERICAN BALLOT 18 (1942).
23 Virginia and Kentucky employed viva voce voting through the Civil War. James
Schouler, Evolution of the American Voter, in 2 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 665,
671 (George B. Adams et al. eds., 1897) (“[I]n the appeal to unflinching manliness at the
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ballots,24 balloting practices—such as brightly colored ballots—commonly
connected a voter to his choice.25 Voting through much of the nineteenth
century, whether through voice voting or paper balloting, was a very public
act.26 Most scholarly references to open balloting discuss its purpose of
securing voter accountability.27 A less examined feature of voice voting and
other forms of open balloting was its instrumental function as a primitive
election transparency tool, allowing onlookers to literally tally for themselves
who won and who lost.28
Given the small population and even smaller pool of eligible voters in early
U.S. elections (only propertied males held the franchise),29 open voting served
transparency’s legitimizing purpose well. But as the franchise expanded,
especially after the Civil War,30 elections became increasingly complex and
difficult to administer. Transient and illiterate populations and large urban
immigrant communities made the process of determining voter eligibility
polls these two states insisted still that every voter should show at the hustings the courage
of his personal conviction.”).
24 According to one historian, paper ballots were first used in Colonial America by the
congregation of the Salem church for choosing its minister in 1629. ALBRIGHT, supra note
22, at 14.
25 The practice of political parties distributing brightly colored ballots is the most
obvious example of paper ballots connecting the voter to his choice. See ALBRIGHT, supra
note 22, at 20 (“[P]arty leaders began to print the tickets [ballots] on colored paper so that
they could be recognized some distance from the polling place. Thus there could be no
secrecy.”). The idea that the state should print and distribute ballots is first evidenced in
California and Louisiana in the 1870s, but was not widely adopted until much later. Id.
26 MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH, WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING: THE DECLINE OF
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS 126
(2000) (“During the late nineteenth century, when people cast flamboyant, party-printed
tickets, voting was an open act in which an individual’s partisan preference was visible to
the entire community.”).
27 John Crowley, Uses and Abuses of the Secret Ballot in the American Age of Reform,
in THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE SECRET BALLOT 45, 51 (Romain Bertrand et al. eds., 2006)
(“[A]s Habermas has stressed, early bourgeois liberalism took it for granted that ‘publicity’
was the only secure basis of political virtue.”); see also Schouler, supra note 23, at 671
(suggesting that use of the secret ballot was “un-manly”).
28 For those who demanded less ephemeral records, Colonial Rhode Island, New York,
and New Jersey adopted the English rule allowing copies of the polls indicating voter
choices to be delivered on demand to anyone willing to pay reasonable fees for copying
them. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 225 (2010) (citing Bishop, supra note 4, at 186 ).
29 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (rev. ed. 2009) (“On the eve of the American
Revolution, in seven colonies men had to own land of specified acreage or monetary value in
order to participate in elections; elsewhere, the ownership of personal property of a
designated value (or in South Carolina, the payment of taxes) could substitute for real
estate.”).
30 PAUL KLEPPNER, WHO VOTED? 33 (1982) (“The post-1876 phase witnessed as full a
mobilization of the mass electorate as this country has ever experienced. Better than threequarters of the national electorate voted in presidential years. . . . ”).
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difficult.31 States relied heavily on powerful political parties to do much of the
work of administering elections—a task parties were only too happy to
undertake. Nineteenth-century American elections were run largely out of
government hands. Parties printed and distributed ballots,32 brought (their)
voters to polling places, and oversaw vote tabulation.33 Polling locations were
commonly housed in non-state-owned establishments such as private homes,
hotels, saloons, and stores.34 Nineteenth-century election officials were not paid
state employees but political party representatives or appointees. In many cases,
a township’s majority party would stack the polls with election judges from its
own ranks.35
Increasingly, as the electorate expanded and political parties grew in
entrenchment and hubris, American elections began to spin out of control.36
Transparency measures originally intended to instill public confidence in
election results instead rendered the opposite effect. Historians describing this
era report widespread problems at the polls. Public drunkenness at polling
places, voter intimidation, and violence diminish the democratic process.37
31 RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY 17–18 (2004) (noting the difficulties of confirming voter eligibility: “[M]uch of
the United States during the nineteenth century was a preliterate society; until the turn of the
century, in fact, there were many counties in which a quarter or more of adult white men
could not read or write. This meant that voters were unable to keep records of when they
were born or how long they had resided in a town or neighborhood. Since government
agencies seldom kept records of these things, there were no certificates that could be
presented to election officials. . . . This was less true of citizenship, where the federal
government provided naturalization papers when immigrants became American citizens.
However, since native-born citizens were not given such certificates, election officials had to
know when and whom to ask for papers.”).
32 Ballots were commonly printed on brightly colored paper, which served to confirm
which party slate the voter had selected. As one historian noted of the practice of parties
printing ballots on colored paper, “[s]ecrecy, quite obviously, was not a characteristic of the
voting process.” RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE HISTORY OF VOTING IN NEW JERSEY: A
STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION MACHINERY 1664–1911, at 114 (1953).
33 One historian describes the problem of the practice of town meeting selection of
election officials in the late 1700s in New Jersey, which often resulted in election officials
from the same political party overseeing elections. Id. at 97.
34 See BENSEL, supra note 31, at 10 (listing polling places in Saint Louis in 1859 as a
representative example of the non-state-owned polling sites).
35 There are several accounts of election judges being selected from opposing parties.
Id. at 18. In other cases, election judges were voted in on the day of the election by “those
men who happened to be present.” Id. at 37. Bensel notes that the selection of election
judges was often a complex matter, “reflecting a mixture of community norms, notions of
fair play between the party organizations, and the formal provisions set down in the statutory
code. Id.
36 See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 114.
37 Id. at 151–52 (“Scenes of drunkenness at the polls had become traditional. Indeed, in
a great many places voting still took place in a ‘hotel,’ which made resort to spirituous
refreshment both onvenient and tempting.”). BENSEL, supra note 31, at 20 (“[T]he street or
square outside the voting window frequently became a kind of alcoholic festival in which
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Polling places were routinely rife with party operatives engaged in vote-buying
efforts, “distribut[ing] tickets [to voters], lin[ing] up last minute vote-sellers,
and monitor[ing] ballot casting to be sure their investments paid off.”38 Far
from enhancing public confidence in election outcomes, transparency enhanced
vote buyers’ confidence in their investment.39
As election corruption persisted, state legislatures routinely attempted to
restore order in the election process.40 But such attempts were fruitless in the
face of majoritarian politics and strong political party grip on the election
process.41 Statutory attempts to achieve fair and clean elections were repeatedly
overwhelmed by the power of the party system and even collusion among
elected officials to thwart anti-fraud measures.42 Ultimately, the reform that
most effectively reduced corruption also drastically reduced election
many men were clearly and spectacularly drunk . . . the crowds gathered around the polls
often insulted voters who appeared to be supporting the opposing party. These insults easily
moved into various forms of physical intimidation as members of the crowd, either
individually or in groups, blocked the passage of prospective voters . . . implicitly
threatening violence if the voter pressed his way forward.”).
38 Frederic Charles Schaffer, Might Cleaning Up Elections Keep People Away from the
Polls?, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 69, 75 (2002). One account detailed party workers armed
with “improper tickets . . . headed by the name of one party but containing the names of the
other party’s candidates, in order to deceive the unwary voter.” MCCORMICK, supra note 32,
at 114.
39 Casting votes was not the only raucous process. Historians depict debauched tallying
environments as well. Counting often took place in private residences or in less-thandignified public facilities. One account describes a barroom tally where little separated the
reveling masses from the counting tables. BENSEL, supra note 31, at 50–51 (describing a
scene in 1858: “William Stokely, one of the canvassers, described the enclosed area in which
the voting and counting occurred as about ‘ten feet wide by nineteen feet long . . . .’
Although the bar was closed to paying customers, liquor passed freely between the barroom
and the men inside this space both during the hours when the polls were open and afterward
when the counting of the tickets was conducted.”).
40 New Jersey’s well-documented experience in this regard is illustrative. In 1871 the
New Jersey legislature passed by wide margin what was described as a drastic act: depriving
those who bribed or received bribes for votes the right to vote. New Jersey’s governor
offered law officers rewards for enforcing the new law, prompting his successor to later
pronounce that “No recent act of legislation has given such general satisfaction, or been
more rigidly enforced.” MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 151. These evaluations “proved to be
somewhat extravagant,” as rampant fraud soared in New Jersey well after. Id.
41 Characterizing the period between 1839 and 1876, historian Richard McCormick
describes how political parties commonly circumvented legislative attempts to right the ship:
“[P]arty organizations became highly perfected instruments for controlling votes, and each
party understandably viewed every [reform] proposal . . . from its own biased
perspective . . . [S]ound and reasonable proposals—such as those relating to registration of
voters, [a]ssembly districts, or bipartisan election boards—might be twisted into flagrantly
partisan schemes for gaining an advantage over the opposition.” Id. at 155.
42 Id. at 165–66 (describing elections in nineteenth-century New Jersey: “Election
boards were theoretically bipartisan in that one of the members represented the minority
party. But all too often the minority member proved to be a willing confederate of the
majority in sanctioning frauds.”).

788

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:4

transparency: the secret ballot. Reformers saw the secret ballot as a means of
foiling would-be vote buyers by taking away their ability to confirm purchased
votes. By 1896, ninety percent of U.S. states had moved to secret balloting;
many had amended their constitutions to require it.43
The secret ballot was not, however, the only transparency-constricting
reform of this era. Attempts to rid elections of fraud proved difficult when
political parties still dominated the mechanics of elections. Thus reformers
aimed their sights at constraining political parties’ role in election
administration. In the late 1800s, and the early part of the twentieth century,
reformers instituted a series of election reforms intended to bring voting
processes and procedures under state purview.44 Reformers sought to cut
political parties out of their dominant role in running U.S. elections by limiting
their grip on election officiating;45 moving polling locations to suitable public
buildings;46 requiring government-run (and -funded) ballot printing and
distribution, including strict state regulation of ballot design;47 and instituting a
43 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 204–05 (1992) (citing Jerrold Glenn Rusk, The

Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting 1876–1908 (1968)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUB Gottingen)).
44 Frank O’Gorman, The Secret Ballot in Nineteenth-Century Britain, in THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE SECRET BALLOT, supra note 27, at 16, 30–31. O’Gorman notes other
examples of transparency restrictions the secret ballot entailed, for example abolition of the
practice of publishing poll books that revealed individual voter choice. Id. at 32.
45 Examples of public agitation for nonpartisan election officials included a petition
from New York suggesting that “the ballot should be delivered to the voter within the
polling-place on election day, by sworn public officials.” ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 26
(citing a New York Ballot Reform League petition). Summarizing advocacy for ballot
reform, Albright suggests that, “[i]n brief, the two features usually advocated by [reform]
organizations were first, an official uniform ballot, printed at public expense, and, second,
secret voting within the polling-place under official supervision.” Id. States passed laws to
curtail the overtly partisan nature of election officiating. In New Jersey, for example, an
1889 bill adopted a somewhat contorted process intended to diffuse the power of parties in
selecting election officials:
The governor appointed annually in each county a four-man board made up of two men
nominated by the state chairmen of each of the major parties. The county boards in turn
appointed, on the nomination of the county party chairmen, similar bipartisan, four-man
district boards of elections. The board members served for one-year terms and were
required to be residents of the district. Each board appointed two poll clerks.

MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 177. McCormick describes a method instituted in 1911 to
appoint officials whereby “the county chairmen of the two major parties each nominated two
or more men of good moral character.” The Civil Service Commission would then conduct
annual examinations of the nominees for fitness. In addition, the reforms limited the terms in
office of election officials to two years. Id. at 209.
46 MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 179 (explaining that municipal officials were
instructed to provide suitable rooms).
47 The state-printed ballot profoundly impacted political processes in this country in
ways beyond election administration. See KORNBLUH, supra note 26, at 124–126 (discussing
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system of voter registration that cut out the party middleman from deciding who
approached the polls.48
Reformers drafted legislation to ensure cast-ballot security, ranging from
strict chain-of-custody provisions to ballot box sealing rules.49 Many state
legislatures implemented laws requiring that cast ballots be destroyed postelection, usually after a specified period to ensure finality of results.50 These
measures constricted transparency by bringing much of the voting process
behind an official veil. By erecting transparency boundaries, reformers sought
to bolster public confidence and tame the circus elections had become.
Although states wrested control of most voting processes from political
parties, reformers understood that transparency could not be eliminated.
Political parties would be unwilling to cede power without mechanisms to
confirm the other party had not committed fraud or otherwise stolen the vote.
Those unhappy with election outcomes would allege fraud, corruption, or
official collusion in throwing the election if elections were conducted entirely
out of view. State legislatures therefore passed statutes giving explicit roles to
party representatives in election processes, creating a system of what will be

the impact of the state-printed ballot on state party politics). Government controlled ballot
printing and distribution transformed election mechanics. First, the cost to the state of
running elections greatly increased. As a result, states began to consolidate elections and
terms of office lengthened. Id. Second, ballot design became an important means of ensuring
that party operatives were not able to slip fraudulent ballots into the box. For example, in the
1930s, Arkansas’s “Pure Election Law” required ballots to include carbon copies with a line
for voters to sign on the duplicate copy. The box containing signed duplicates was to remain
unopened unless an election contest ensued. ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 46–47. States also
experimented with signed ballot “stubs” as a means of verifying that voters who entered the
polling place cast the same ballot they were handed. Id. at 44. Some states developed ballots
equipped with numbered stubs. Stubs typically contained a consecutive numbering system
such that the ballot cast could be matched with ballot handed to the voter. Early versions of
ballot stubs required voters to write their names on the stub linking the voter’s name to the
ballot number. Id. Other states required election judges, sometimes including the
requirement that judges be from different political parties, to initial the stub. Id. at 46.
48 KORNBLUH, supra note 26, at 133. By 1920, thirty-six states had adopted personal
registration systems that required individuals to personally register and periodically reregister to vote. Registration reforms thus “wrested control of the registration process from
the parties and turned it over to civil servants.” Id.
49 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.805 (West 2005) (“After all ballots are
tied in packages or rolls, the board of election inspectors shall place the ballots in ballot bags
approved by the secretary of state. The board of election inspectors shall then seal the bags
with an approved seal. . . .”).
50 Many jurisdictions still follow this practice. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.493
(West 2014) (“After twenty-two months, the ballots, ballot cards, processed ballot materials
in electronic form, write-in forms, applications, statements, certificates, affidavits and
computer programs relating to each election may be destroyed.”); see also Price v. Town of
Fairlee, 26 A.3d 26, 34 (Vt. 2011) (granting citizen access to voted ballots and tally sheet
two years after an election under Vermont’s public records act despite statutory instruction
that material be destroyed ninety days from the date of the election).
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termed here “structured transparency.”51 Structured transparency rules consisted
of defined roles for political party representatives at various stages in the
election process. Some state statutes required that election officers be drawn
from opposing political parties.52 Others passed poll watcher statutes that
required one representative from each major party to observe each phase of the
voting process.53 These statutes knighted campaign and political party
representatives to act as proxies for public oversight throughout the election
process. State poll watcher and counting-observation statutes of this era
typically allowed only major political parties and candidates to appoint poll
watchers and counting observers as party or candidate representatives.54 Often
statutes required party and candidate representatives to register or receive

51 Interestingly, I found no evidence that structured transparency included a formal role

for the press. I found evidence of no Progressive Era statute formally allowing members of
the press access inside polling places, although several accounts from this era detail press
involvement in verifying and communicating election returns to the public. See, e.g.,
ROBERT J. DINKIN, ELECTION DAY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 122 (2002). In many states,
the press plays a central role in conducting exit polling and communicating electoral
outcomes. See James Brown & Paul L. Hain, Private Administration of a Public Function:
The News Election Service, 2 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 389, 396 (1980). As discussed below,
since 2000, the press (both traditional and nontraditional) has become more aggressive in
monitoring the election process. See Aimee Edmonson, Election Transparency: The Next
FREEDOM
OF
INFORMATION
COALITION,
Great
FOI
Story?,
NATIONAL
http://www.nfoic.org/print/election-transparency, archived at http://perma.cc/W79Q-BKEA.
52 See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 177.
53 Most states allowed one poll watcher from each party and/or one poll watcher
representing each candidate to view the voting process. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16603 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN § 101.131(1) (West 2014); see also Daniels, supra note 10, at
250. Many states have explicit rules allowing party representatives to oversee vote counting.
E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-22-2 (West 2013) (permitting party and candidate
representatives to observe vote counting). Interestingly, this statute notes that while vote
counting must be public, “no notice or advertisement of these [vote counting] sessions needs
to be given.” Id.
54 Many states still confine access to political party representatives and candidates.
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408 (West 2014) (“In an election or run-off election, each
political party and political body shall each be entitled to designate, at least seven days prior
to . . . such election or run-off election, no more than two official poll watchers [in each
precinct] to be selected by the appropriate party or body executive committee.”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 22-15-109 (2013) (“The county chairman of each political party may certify
poll watchers prior to the day of the election to serve in each precinct. Not more than one (1)
poll watcher from each political party may serve simultaneously unless the chief judge
determines that one (1) additional poll watcher from each political party may be
accommodated in the polling premises without disrupting the polling process.”). More
recently, several states have passed statutes that do not restrict poll watchers to political
party representatives. Beginning in 1990, for example, a Wisconsin statute grants any
member of the public the right to observe at polling places. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 7.41(1) (West
2013) (“Any member of the public may be present at any polling place, . . . except a
candidate whose name appears on the ballot at the polling place. . . .”).
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accreditation from parties or candidates prior to assuming observer roles,55 and
included strict rules for where observers could stand and what they could see.56
States also wrote procedures for party and candidate representatives to observe
vote counting at the close of elections and during recounts.57 In this way,
Progressive Era transparency reforms carefully calibrated transparency to
impose order on what had been an unruly and undignified process.58 As will be
discussed further below, many state election codes still feature structured

55 E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 15, § 4977 (West 2007) (mandating that poll watchers be

accredited).
56 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (LexisNexis 2007) (describing process by which
party-appointed poll watchers may observe certain election processes including monitoring
poll opening, observing inside the polling place on election day, and monitoring vote
counting).
57 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 353 (1907) (“Each political party or organization having
candidates nominated may . . . name a watcher who shall be permitted to be present at the
place where the ballots are cast from the time the polls are opened until the ballots are
counted and certificates of the result of the election signed by the inspectors.”); IND. CODE
§ 6248 (1901) (“No person, other than the members of the election board, poll clerks,
election sheriffs and the duly authorized watchers representing the various political parties,
shall be permitted in the room during the election, or during the canvass of the votes, except
for the purpose of voting.”).
58 Even state-dominated election administration had a limited ability to prevent
widespread election wrongdoing, as witnessed during the Civil Rights Era when the
dominant party and state governments colluded to prevent minority voting. Just as partydominated election processes corrupted the electoral process the century before, so too did
state-managed elections in the Jim Crow South disfigure election processes. Whether in the
form of poll taxes, literacy tests, registration barriers, intimidation at the polls, or bald
violence, minority voters were effectively denied meaningful electoral participation. See
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969, at 131–32
(1976) (describing racial violence at polling places). Transparency measures played a critical
role in the federal electoral reforms of the 1960s aimed at preventing discrimination in the
South. A prominent example is federal observer provisions in the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA). See H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 29 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437,
2460. The VRA authorizes federal courts and the U.S. Attorney General to send federal
observers to certified jurisdictions to “secure equal voting rights of all citizens.” Id. Under
the VRA, the Department of Justice is empowered to dispatch federal observers to observe
polling and ballot counting locations throughout the South. Federal observers were an
important part of documenting enduring discrimination and ensuring that laws intending to
prevent discrimination took effect on the ground. See James Thomas Tucker, The Power of
Observation: The Role of Federal Observers Under the Voting Rights Act, 13 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 227, 230 (2007) (describing federal observers under the VRA as “non-lawyer
employees of the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) authorized to
observe ‘whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote’ and ‘whether
votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated.”’). It will be interesting to
see whether federal observer provisions of the VRA survive (and potentially thrive)
following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Section 4 coverage formula in Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). See also Gray, supra note 11 (arguing for
expanded federal observation under the Voting Rights Act).
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transparency provisions giving explicit roles to candidate and party
representatives as the deputized eyes and ears of the public.59
Other than 1960s-era federal civil rights statutes mandating federal
observation of voting in certain (mostly Southern) states,60 structured
transparency norms continued on an unremarkable path until the 2000
presidential election when major shortcomings in our system of elections were
alarmingly exposed.61 Since Bush v. Gore, reliance on structured transparency
has begun to buckle amidst radically changed circumstances. Changes in the
way Americans vote, the digitization of U.S. elections, and changing oversight
norms since Bush v. Gore have combined to challenge basic principles of
structured transparency—and election oversight generally. Throughout U.S.
history, transparency rules and norms have adapted to changed circumstances;
as the next section demonstrates, public faith in electoral outcomes suffers when
state transparency rules fail to adapt.

III. POST-BUSH V. GORE: RADICALLY CHANGED ELECTION LANDSCAPE
Since Bush v. Gore, the country has witnessed a series of fundamental shifts
that markedly destabilized the election transparency balance. This section
describes these changes and the failure of transparency rules to adapt to them.
The first part reviews the changed nature of American voting and the reasons
why structured transparency norms fall short given new voting realities. The
next part examines the digitization of U.S. election administration and its
resulting promise and peril for election transparency. The final part of this
section explores how changes in oversight culture place stress on structured
election oversight norms.

A. Changes in Voting
Before 1980, less than 5% of the U.S. voting public cast ballots before
election day, typically through mail-in absentee voting.62 By 2000, 14% of
voters nationwide cast early ballots; by 2004, 20% of Americans voted before

59
60
61
62

See, e.g., supra note 54.
See generally Tucker, supra note 58.
See Adler & Hall, supra note 12, at 147.
Michael P. McDonald, A Modest Early Voting Rise in 2012, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 12, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/a-modestearly-voting-ris_b_3430379.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PTQ4-E8TZ; see also John C.
Fortier, Early Voting a Boon to Whom?, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/John_C__Fortier_F39B1257-0631-4A87-AAE328784D8EC040.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y42Y-EM6G.
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election day.63 In the 2008 presidential election, 30.6% of American voters cast
their vote before election day.64

Figure 1: Early and Mail-in Voting, 1972–201265

In the past, many states required voters who requested to vote by mail to
provide an excuse for why they could not vote at the polls on election day.
States often created lists of permissible excuses entitling voters to mail-in
ballots. Today, twenty-seven states (and the District of Columbia) allow noexcuse absentee or mail-in voting.66 Three states, Washington, Oregon, and
Colorado, are experimenting with all-mail elections, doing away with polling
places altogether. 67
63 THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, BALANCING ACCESS AND INTEGRITY 65 (2005),
http://old.tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb542/baichap6.pdf.
64 2012 Early Voting Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections.gmu.edu/
early_vote_2012.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/HTV22Q6V.
65 McDonald, supra note 62. The 2013 Presidential Commission on Election
Administration Report’s endorsement of expanded opportunities for early and mail-in voting
seems sure to feed the wave. THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 56
(2014) [hereinafter PCEA REPORT] (“Recommendation: States should expand opportunities
to vote before Election Day.”).
66 See Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/F3PM-XCXH?type=image.
67 COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7.5-104 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 254.465 (2013);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.40.010 (West 2014). Other states are toying with all-mail
voting. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4001 (West 2014) (pilot program in Yolo county that
allows mail-in only elections). Some states are experimenting with designating certain areas
for mail-in elections (for example, for small districts or districts far from polling stations).
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.343 (LexisNexis 2013) (small districts and districts
which the county clerk deems mail voting districts are mail voting districts); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 1-6-22.1 (LexisNexis 2012) (mail-in districts created when district is 100 voters or
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In addition to expanded mail-in voting, many states have introduced and
expanded early in-person voting opportunities (EIPV).68 As distinguished from
voting by mail, EIPV allows voters to cast ballots at designated locations for a
specified period before election day. Early voting garnered significant attention
in the 2012 election. Campaigns pushed supporters to cast early ballots for a
variety of strategic reasons.69 In 2012, President Obama became the first major
presidential candidate to cast an early vote.70 Like lists of voters who requested
mail-in ballots, lists of voters who cast votes early have become valuable to
campaigns and groups interested in election oversight.71
Provisional voting is another example of a nontraditional form of voting on
the rise. To address the problem of voters being turned away wrongfully at the
polls, the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA)72 mandated that voters whose
eligibility to vote is in question at the polls be offered a provisional ballot.73

less and nearest polling place is twenty miles away or more); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-302
(LexisNexis 2013) (election officer may choose to conduct election entirely by mail-in
ballot).
68 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, any qualified voter in
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia may cast a ballot in person during a
designated period prior to election day. No excuse or justification is required. See Absentee
and Early Voting, supra note 66.
69 See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, Campaigns Still Pushing Early Voting in Iowa, WASH.
POST (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/11/05/
campaigns-still-pushing-early-voting-in-iowa/, archived at http://perma.cc/682J-6W62;
Sasha Issenberg, How President Obama’s Campaign Used Big Data to Rally Individual
Voters, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/
509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-to-rally-voters/, archived at http://perma.cc/V64PPG9S; Nick Judd, Why Campaigns Are Happy Your Vote Isn’t as Private as Many Think It
Is, TECHPRESIDENT (Oct. 22, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/23032/do-you-care-ifobama-knows-you-voted-what-about-if-he-told-your-friends,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/73GL-2FQC.
70 Gregory J. Krieg, Obama Casts Early Vote and Reminds Dems of 2000 Recount,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/obama-cast-early-votereminds-dems-2000-recount/story?id=17563272#.UX8XfyuFSbw,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/7VDC-EELW.
71 See Nancy Hicks, Mail-in Mission: Campaigns Chasing Early Votes, LINCOLN
JOURNAL STAR (Apr. 13, 2013), http://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/mail-inmission-campaigns-chasing-early-votes/article_b40cd17e-c35a-5346-9690-89ab6e242c50.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/6447-4MML (discussing the targeting of early voters
noting that 85–90% of those who request ballots cast them); Michael P. McDonald, Early
Voting in 2012: What to Expect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2012, 4:19
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/early-voting-in-2012-what_b_
1773768.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C6CG-UXT4 (examining the ways campaigns
use early voting data).
72 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 302, 116 Stat.
1706 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2012)).
73 The reasons a voter may be offered a provisional ballot include but are not limited
to:
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Once handed a provisional ballot, the provisional voter must sign an affidavit
declaring that she is eligible and registered to vote in that jurisdiction. If the
voter is later confirmed to be eligible, HAVA requires that the state must count
that provisional ballot.74
The volume of provisional votes cast since HAVA mandated their existence
is far from trivial. In the 2012 presidential election, for example, Kansas issued
38,865 provisional ballots, 3.5% of all ballots cast.75 Election officials in
Kansas rejected approximately 35% of provisional votes cast.76 States like
Pennsylvania have seen sharp increases in provisional voting rates. In 2008,
Pennsylvania voters cast 33,000 provisional ballots.77 In 2012, Pennsylvania
election officials issued 49,000 provisional ballots (even though voter turnout in
Pennsylvania decreased).78 Ohio has issued provisional ballots at the highest
rate of any state in the country. In the 2012 presidential election, Ohioans cast
208,087 provisional ballots.79
New trends in voting have wreaked havoc on the ability of existing
transparency rules to inspire confidence in electoral outcomes. Few state
transparency statutes explicitly mention mail-in ballot envelopes, lists of mailin, early and provisional voters, or access to electronic poll books. In recent
years, the nation has discovered how old rules very often fail to adequately
account for new transparency demands. The Franken–Coleman U.S. Senate
recount in Minnesota provides a dramatic early example. During the November
2008 election, 281,291 Minnesota voters (9.6% of total votes cast) cast civilian
mail-in ballots.80 When the vote totals separated the candidates by only 215
1. The voter’s name does not appear on the official list of voters at his or her polling
place
2. The voter’s eligibility is challenged in accordance with state law
3. A court order requiring provisional ballots
4. A court order extending polling place hours
5. State law mandates provisional ballots.

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, VOTER GUIDE (2011), available at
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/EAC_VotersGuidePrint%20(2).pdf.
74 HAVA § 302(a).
75 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2012 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND
VOTING
SURVEY
(2013),
available
at
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/990050%20EAC%20VoterSurvey_508Compliant.pdf.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Election officials counted 173,765 provisional ballots and rejected 34,322. Ohio
Secretary of State Husted Releases Absentee and Provisional Ballot Reports for 2012
SECRETARY
ST.
(Jan.
9,
2012),
Presidential
Election,
OHIO
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/mediaCenter/2013/2013-01-09a.aspx,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/T3ZL-YBA7?type=source.
80 According to The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, an additional 11,255 voters
cast ballots under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA),
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, 2008 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING
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votes,81 the Franken recount team’s preliminary litigation strategy focused on
mail-in ballots. The Franken team’s first move was to file a series of Minnesota
Data Practices Act suits when election officials in many counties (including
populous Ramsey County) refused to turn over the names of mail-in voters.82
Some counties, such as Beltrami County in northwest Minnesota, complied with
the Franken team’s requests. Others did not. When Franken sued for access,
Minnesota courts had difficulty agreeing on how to classify mail-in ballot
materials under the Act.83 Explained lead recount attorney Marc Elias, “This is
about giving us access to the data that will allow us to determine whether or not
there are lawful ballots.”84 Elias did not just want access to the mail-in ballots
themselves. He sought access to everything: mail-in ballot envelopes; lists of
voters who voted by mail; rules and training manuals governing election
administration in the state; anything and everything that would help him build
his case.85
The press pushed back on Elias’s strategy to find and question mail-in
voters in counties that turned over mail-in voting lists and other materials. One
reporter wondered, “[m]ight that be seen as some level of [voter]
intimidation?”86 But the media didn’t wonder long. Soon reporters got into the
game of ferreting out mail-in voters to “f[ind] real people whose real votes were
in real doubt.”87 State statutes were unprepared for such access requests, leaving
judges to decide.
Even in less dramatic circumstances, non-polling place voting presents
numerous transparency challenges. Observers have cautioned that voting by
mail increases opportunities for fraud.88 At polling places, strict laws define
SURVEY (2009), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2008%20Election
%20Administration%20and%20Voting%20Survey%20EAVS%20Report.pdf.
81 MINN. SEC’Y ST., THE STATE OF MINNESOTA CANVASSING REPORT (2008).
82 Jay Weiner, The Coleman-Franken Recount: See You in Court Sooner—and Later,
MINNPOST (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/11/colemanfranken-recount-see-you-court-sooner-–-and-later, archived at http://perma.cc/935C-Y2BE
(“[T]he Franken campaign requested that information under the state’s Data Practices Act.
[A Ramsey County election official] and election officials in many other counties, including
Hennepin, denied the request. Some county officials gladly handed over the data, including
the elections chief in Beltrami County. . . .”).
83 Even after the recount had concluded, it took a separate suit by local media to
determine the status of mail-in ballot materials under Minnesota’s Data Practices Act.
KSTP-TV v. Ramsey Cnty., 806 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn. 2011) (holding that sealed mail-in
ballots constituted non-public government data, and thus, television stations were precluded
from accessing and copying the ballots).
84 JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: HOW AL FRANKEN WON THE MINNESOTA
SENATE RECOUNT 42 (2010).
85 Interview with Marc Elias, Partner, Perkins Coie (May 30, 2013).
86 WEINER, supra note 84, at 43.
87 Id.
88 E.g., Allison R. Hayward, Bentham and Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and
Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 58 (2010) (“Innovations like ‘no
excuses’ absentee voting and permanent absentee status, by broadening the base of voters
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circumstances when voters may receive help when casting their vote; otherwise,
the voter must enter the private booth alone.89 Not so for a ballot cast in a living
room. Mail-in ballot fraud can take place in numerous ways, for example,
watchdog groups claim that election fraudsters in Florida paid elderly Hispanic
voters for their mail-in ballots in 2012.90 Critics of mail-in voting also cite
instances of intimidation of mail-in voters, concerns about mail-in voter
privacy, and a lack of audit standards in mail-in vote tabulation.91
States have done little to confront oversight problems associated with mailin voting. Most states allow members of the public to access lists of people who
have cast early in-person or mail-in ballots prior to election day.92 Several mailvoting outside the protection of the polls, would logically increases [sic] the availability of
absentee ballots for fraud. But even in jurisdictions where these innovations have not been
adopted, a culture of absentee fraud can flourish. With the cooperation of a willing notary,
for example, even the affidavit provisions of these stricter laws provide no guarantee against
fraud.”). In Oregon and Washington, all-mail-vote states, criticism has been especially
pointed. See, e.g., Brad Friedman, Why ‘Vote-by-Mail’ Elections Are a Terrible Idea for
Democracy, BRAD BLOG (May 20, 2008, 6:35 AM), http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6003,
archived at http://perma.cc/BQ3A-AGZ7 (“Many are unaware that their mailed-in ballots
will be scanned by the same error-prone, easily manipulated optical-scan machines which
handle paper ballots for precinct-based voting. But even worse, ballots mailed in, if they
arrive safely, and are counted at all, are usually counted ‘in the dark,’ versus ballots scanned
either at the polls on election day, or at county headquarters after the close of polls when
citizens are often there to watch. It is also much harder to track such ballots. Unlike ballots
cast at the polls, where sign-in rosters can be compared to the number of ballots counted, it’s
far more difficult to match up such numbers after ballots are dropped into the black hole that
is the U.S. Postal System.”); Jason Mercier, What Oregon Can Teach Us About Mail-in
Voting, CROSSCUT (Nov. 1, 2012), http://crosscut.com/2012/11/01/elections/111266/
election-results-weeks-waiting-mail-voting/, archived at http://perma.cc/S7WF-DEKT
(“[T]he real problem of Washington’s month-long election is the cynicism and distrust it
unnecessarily breeds in the state’s election results.”).
89 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-2-2 (West 2013) (requiring that voters must “[m]ark
the ballot in the presence of no other person, unless the voter requests help in marking a
ballot under [§] 3-11-9.”).
90 Marianela
Toledo,
Absentee
Ballot
Fraud
Rampant
in
Florida,
FLORIDAWATCHDOG.ORG (Aug. 16, 2013), http://watchdog.org/101444/absentee-ballotfraud-rampant-in-florida/, archived at http://perma.cc/CGK2-8Z2F; see also Adam Liptak,
Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/politics/as-more-vote-by-mail-faulty-ballots-couldimpact elections.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/4C3X-F7KC.
91 Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth Colker, Absentee Voting by People with Disabilities:
Promoting Access and Integrity, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1015, 1024–28 (2007) (discussing
concerns about mail-in voting including inter alia security, fraud, and lack of privacy).
92 E.g., ALA. CODE § 17-11-5 (LexisNexis 2007) (list of mail-in ballot applicants is
publicly posted and accessible); ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.180 (2012) (mail-in voter list open to
public inspection); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3203(b)(3) (West 2014) (list of vote by mail ballot
recipients is kept open to public inspection); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-140(c) (West 2014)
(list of names of those who returned a mail-in ballot are kept as public records); GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-384(d) (West 2014) (list of voters that voted by mail-in ballot is kept as a public
record); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1011 (2008) (list of applicants for mail-in ballots are kept as
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in ballot transparency statutes delay public access until after election day has
passed.93 Some states include specific provisions for challenging mail-in voters
during the counting process.94 Several states, following the structured oversight
model, restrict access to early and mail-in voting lists to political parties and
candidates.95 Texas maintains a strict bar on public access to early in-person
and mail-in voter material.96 Hawaii has a fine example of a poorly drafted
election transparency statute. The public may access information about voter
“status,” but that word is undefined, leaving access specifics to anyone’s
guess.97
As numerous candidates, members of the press, and election oversight
activists have discovered, vague pronouncements about accessibility of mail-in
public records); IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.19 (West 2012) (requires a list of mail-in voters be
kept for each district); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 759 (2013) (right to inspect mail-in ballot
applications and envelopes on or before election day); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203B.04(1)(d)
(West 2009) (lists of mail-in voters are available after elections close); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 23-15-625 (West 2012) (list of absentee ballot recipients is available for inspection); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 115.289 (West 2014) (list of names of mail-in voters are subject to public
inspection); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-948 (2008) (records of early voter information is open to
the public); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293C.312 (LexisNexis 2013) (application for mail-in
open to inspection); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-6-6 (LexisNexis 2012) (mail-in voter register is
open for public inspection); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-232 (West 2013) (list of mail-in
voters is open for public inspection); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-258.26 (West 2013)
(military absentee voter list is open for public inspection); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 14130 (West 2014) (post names who requested mail-in ballots); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-15-440
(2012) (list of mail-in ballot recipients is available for public inspection); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20A-3-304.1(4) (LexisNexis 2013) (mail-in voter information is subject to public records
request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2534 (2012) (list of early and mail-in voters is available
for inspection); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-710 (2014) (list of mail-in voters is open to public
inspection); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-706 (2014) (mail-in voter applicants names are subject to
public inspection); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2b (LexisNexis 2013) (list of special mail-in
voters is a permanent record).
93 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203B.04(1)(d) (West 2009) (lists of mail-in voters are
available after elections close).
94 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-416 (West 2013) (counting of mail-in ballots is open to
the public, the name of each mail-in voter is called off so challenges may be issued).
95 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7585 (West 2007) (mail-in voter files are sent to the
candidates on the ballot); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.5-4-15 (West 2013) (mail-in voters are
marked on poll lists and the names are announced to watchers); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-6-8-1
(West 2013) (candidates may appoint watchers); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657:15 (2013)
(candidates may receive list of mail-in voters); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-05-09 (West
2013) (election observers allowed access to early and mail-in voting); 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3146.2c (West 2014) (list of mail-in voters is posted but copies may only be given to
candidates); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-6-304 (2003) (mail-in voters’ names recorded in absentee
poll book); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-8-116 (2003) (all candidates have the right to poll list
copies).
96 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 87.121(f) (West 2010) (express bar on access to lists of
persons who have requested early ballots, though lists of individuals who have voted early
are accessible).
97 HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-97 (West 2008).
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and early voting materials before, during, and after election day commonly
crumble under the weight of election controversy. Often, discerning which
nontraditional voting materials are available to whom falls to individual county
clerk’s assessments of equivocal (and sometimes conflicting) statutory
commands and administrative norms. Decisions—by clerks and courts—made
in this statutory vacuum very often bear the whiff of partisan favoritism.98 The
problem is acute in the area of provisional voting.
HAVA requires states to make available to voters who have cast provisional
ballots a means to verify the status of their provisional ballots.99 But HAVA
specifically restricts access to information about the fate of a cast provisional
ballot to the voter.100 Provisional voting has been controversial in part because
the federal mandate requires states to fill in many gaps, including gaps in the
provisional voting transparency regime.101 Like mail-in ballots, processing
provisional ballots implicates materials other than the provisional ballots
themselves such as lists of provisional voters, poll books, provisional ballot
envelopes, and affidavits. And like mail-in voting materials, provisional voting
produces election materials to which candidates, parties, and citizens will
inevitably demand access when races are close.
Statutory incoherence in the case of public access to provisional balloting
material is pronounced. Fifteen states expressly allow members of the public to
access lists of voters who cast provisional ballots.102 Four states allow access to
98 See supra note 82.
99 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(5)(B) (2012) (“The appropriate State or local election official

shall establish a free access system (such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet
website) that any individual who casts a provisional ballot may access to discover whether
the vote of that individual was counted, and, if the vote was not counted, the reason that the
vote was not counted.”).
100 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2012) (“The appropriate State or local official shall establish and
maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and
integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by the free access
system established under paragraph (5)(B). Access to information about an individual
provisional ballot shall be restricted to the individual who cast the ballot.”).
101 The provisional ballot requirements raise quite a few other concerns outside the
transparency context. See generally Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems of
Provisional Voting, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2005).
102 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4979 (West 2007) (allows oaths and affidavits to be seen,
not a set list); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.0981 (West 2014) (voter history is part of electronic
register system, electronic register system is open to public records requests); GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-72 (West 2014) (affidavits and election records are open to inspection); IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-10-1-31.1(c) (West 2013) (provisional voting materials are open to
inspection); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1122 (West 2013) (list of provisional voters may be
inspected); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.225 (LexisNexis 2004) (provisional voters must sign
precinct list); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.025 (LexisNexis 2004) (precinct lists are available
for inspection); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-311 (LexisNexis 2010) (watchers may
keep lists of provisional voters); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.735 (West 2005)
(provisional voters are recorded in the poll book); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.733 (West
2005) (poll watchers may view poll books); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.430 (West 2014)
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lists of challenged voters, which may (or may not) include voters who cast
provisional ballots.103 Oklahoma allows access to information about provisional
voters, but only after a one-week waiting period or after a recount has ended.104
Eight states affirmatively forbid access to provisional voting materials.105
Eighteen state election codes make no mention of access to provisional voting
materials at all.106
The question of access to names of provisional voters has found its way into
court on numerous occasions. In 2004, a Washington court held that lists of
provisional voters must be released in the name of “the public’s right to an open
and transparent electoral process. . . .”107 Professor Edward Foley, in a blog post
on the eve of the 2012 election, raised questions about whether the identity of
provisional voters in Ohio is public or private. 108 Professor Foley wondered
(watchers are allowed to see the envelopes and affirmations of provisional voters and
allowed to make their own list); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-109 (2013) (all records are open
to public inspection); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.012 (West 2010) (election records are open
to inspection unless stated otherwise); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-5-401 (LexisNexis 2013)
(provisional voters marked on poll list); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-308 (LexisNexis 2013)
(poll list public record); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.45 (West 2013) (provisional voters marked on
poll lists); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.46 (West 2013) (poll lists open for public inspection); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2-113 (2013) (election records are public records; copies of registry list
may be given to candidates).
103 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-594 (2006) (clerks will keep a list of challenged voters
and keep it as a public record); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 673 (2013) (challenged voter list
is available for public inspection); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-206 (McKinney 2007) (poll watchers
may look at challenged voter lists). Rhode Island appears to provide access to challenge lists
only to political parties. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-10-16 (West 2013) (directing that
challenge list shall be prepared and given to the parties).
104 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 7-116.1 (West 2014).
105 ALA. CODE § 17-10-2 (LexisNexis 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-308 (2013); CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 17301 (West 2014); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14310 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18:566.2 (2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 107 (LexisNexis 2006); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293C.390 (LexisNexis 2013); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3068 (West 2014)
(voter lists and other materials are sealed); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-20-21 (2004).
106 See ALASKA STAT. § 15 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9 (West 2014); D.C.
CODE § 1-10 (LexisNexis 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 34 (2008); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 39-63 (West 2012);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 652-671 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1 (LexisNexis 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163
(West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 246-260 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7 (2012); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2 (2014); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 29 (West 2014).
107 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Washington St. Republican Party v. King Cnty.
Div. of Records, No. 04-2-36048-0 SEA (King Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2004), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/WSDCC/WSDCCorder2.pdf.
108 Edward B. Foley, The Identity of Provisional Voters: Private or Public? (An Issue
That Might Emerge Early in Overtime), ELECTIONLAW@MORITZ (Oct. 30, 2012, 8:30 PM),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/freefair/index.php?ID=9981, archived at http://perma.
cc/JP5U-ZFL4?type=image.
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whether Ohio courts would react similarly. HAVA’s language restricting access
to information about provisional ballots is arguably clear on its face as a means
of protecting voter privacy.109 Pondering the tension between Washington’s
take and what might happen in Ohio courts, Professor Foley voiced concern
about Ohio’s statutory readiness to confront the question of access to
provisional voter lists, if, as seemed likely, the election came down to Ohio’s
provisional ballots.110 Echoing Foley, Jeffrey Toobin worried too: “Pause to
consider the chaos that would ensue. Both campaigns would try to track down
the provisional voters, find their proper documentation, and shepherd them
through the process at the county seat. Ballot-by-ballot warfare—for several
hundred thousand votes. And that’s just the start.”111As it turned out, Foley and
Toobin’s fears were not unfounded. Ohio issued 210,000 provisional ballots on
election day 2012; President Obama won the state by 166,214 votes.112
Although Ohio ducked provisional ballot controversy in the 2012
presidential election, it blossomed in the 2012 Kansas house race in the fiftyfourth district. Ann Mah trailed Ken Corbet by a mere 27 votes out of more than
10,000 cast.113 Following the election, Mah contacted county officials
requesting access to lists of voters who had voted provisional ballots intending
to contact each.114 The 2012 election marked the first statewide election in
which its new voter ID statute was in effect.115 Mah believed many voters cast
provisional ballots because of failure to bring proper ID to the polls.116 In
Kansas, provisional votes will only count if voters can produce proper ID at
their local election office in advance of the county canvass.117 Candidates,
therefore, have an incentive to track down individual provisional voters to
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2012).
110 Foley, supra note 108.
111 Jeffrey Toobin, Ready for a

Recount?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ready-for-a-recount,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/AG83-RE6K.
112 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ELECTION LAW,
DIALOGUES ON ELECTION REFORM: A CONTINUING CONVERSATION WITH THE STATES (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/election_law/dialogues_on_ele
ction_reform.authcheckdam.pdf; See also Election Results: Ohio, HUFFPOST POLITICS,
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/2012/results/ohio (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/PF3-GK5N.
113 Andy Marso, Bill Shrouding Provisional Ballots Heads to Governor, TOPEKA CAP.
J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 4:02 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2013-04-07/bill-shrouding-provisionalballots-heads-governor, archived at http://perma.cc/NPS-7HHT.
114 Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-218 (West 2010) (providing for inspection of
public records). Mah, in seeking out provisional voters, hoped to assist in the process of
curing any problems. See Mah v. Shawnee Cnty. Comm’n, No. 12-4148-JTM, 2012 WL
5584613, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2012).
115 See Collin Levy, Kansas Voter ID Success, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/, archived at http://perma.cc/MR5K-JN8L.
116 See Marso, supra note 113.
117 Id.
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ensure they take the necessary steps to verify their eligibility to vote
(particularly when armed with data about which voters to go after).
But the Kansas statute did not address whether candidates should be given
access to lists of provisional voters. Some counties agreed to give Mah access to
the lists. On November 7, clerks in Douglas and Osage Counties provided Mah
access to lists of provisional voters.118 The clerk in Douglas County explained
to the press that, “limited provisional ballot information had always been
considered [an] open record.”119 This prompted Kansas Secretary of State Kris
Kobach to release a memo advising clerks that the names of provisional voters
are not public records and by law cannot be disclosed.120 Kobach’s memo
further reasoned that requests for post-election materials would, “impede the
function of [election officials] and provide an additional burden [on election
officials] at a very busy time.”121
Consistent with the Kobach memo, the Shawnee County commissioner
denied Mah’s request arguing that Kansas law prohibited disclosure, “except as
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”122 Mah promptly secured an
order from the Shawnee County court. Like the Washington court in 2004, the
county court granted the order on the theory that Mah had not requested access
to information about which candidates specific provisional voters voted for, but
only the names of voters who voted provisionally.123
Secretary Kobach immediately obtained an order from a U.S. district court
to prevent Mah’s court order from taking effect.124 Later, in a ruling on the
merits, the U.S. district court ruled against Kobach. The Kansas court aligned
with the Washington court’s holding that the federal law requiring provisional
voters’ access to the status of their ballots did not bar others seeking access to
information about who casts provisional ballots. “Access to information about
[an] individual provisional ballot” the court wrote, “does not protect
information about the individual casting the ballot.”125 In the end, Corbet
defeated Mah by twenty-one votes and the Republican-dominated state
legislature moved to prevent public access to provisional ballot materials.126
118 Mah Suit Gains Access to Provisional Voters’ Names, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Nov. 9, 2012,
1:11 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2012-11-09/mah-suit-gains-access-provisional-votersnames, archived at http://perma.cc/QC6F-VCJ7.
119 Marso, supra note 113.
120 Memorandum from Ryan Kriegshauser, Assistant Sec’y of State, Office of the Kan.
Sec’y of State to Kan. Cnty. Counselors c/o Kan. Cnty. Election Officers (Nov. 8, 2012),
available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/KansasVoteMemo.pdf.
121 Id.
122 Marso, supra note 113.
123 Mah v. Shawnee Cnty. Comm’n, No. 12-4148-JTM, 2012 WL 5584613, at *1 (D.
Kan. Nov. 15, 2012).
124 Marso, supra note 113.
125 Mah, 2012 WL 5584613, at *3.
126 S.B. 177, 2013 Leg., (Kan. 2013); Andy Marso, Senate Roundup: Bill Inspired by
Mah Race Approved, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://m.cjonline.com/news/2013-02-
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Commenting on provisional ballot access in Kansas, a political scientist at
the University of Missouri expressed concern:
If legislatures and courts rule that provisional ballot information is not
public, I expect that absentee, vote-by-mail, and early voting would be the next
logical targets for a similar ruling. Restricting public access to ballot
information would impose a significant curb on campaign activity aimed at
those forms of voting. It is certainly an interesting strategy for curbing postelection litigation—quash public access to the evidence needed for such
litigation.127

Is curbing access to provisional and other new forms of voting materials a
desirable constriction aimed at preserving the dignity and decorum of elections?
Or, should such material be made widely available to assure the public that
ineligible voters did not vote? In the case of state response to provisional ballot
transparency, the jury appears to be out.
The story of election officials’ inconsistent responses to requests for access
to election materials is often told, in part because local election officials—
keepers of the vast majority of election materials128—are commonly left
rudderless by vague or inconsistent election transparency statutes. As
nontraditional forms of voting rise in prominence, the lack of oversight rules
does damage to public confidence in the legitimacy of our elections and throws
that uncertainty to judges, who are less than thrilled to enter the political thicket.

B. The Digitization of U.S. Elections
In the days when U.S. voters cast paper ballots in voting booths on election
day, the question of election oversight was relatively straightforward. Even
when new forms of paper balloting complicated oversight (butterfly ballots are
a perfect example), the ability to review outcomes still constituted a manual
review of physical objects. Now that so many voters in the United States vote
on machines, meaningful oversight of vote tallying has become a more complex
matter.129
28/senate-roundup-bill-inspired-mah-race-approved, archived at http://perma.cc/SPG7QDFC.
127 David Kimball, online comment to Doug Chapin, Controversy Over Provisional
Ballots Leads to Litigation, Legislation in Kansas, ELECTION ACADEMY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:18
AM),
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2013/04/controversy_over_provisional_b.php,
archived at http://perma.cc/8PSW-7VJC.
128 See, e.g., Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 399 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding
that federal public access provisions in the National Voting Registration Act did not apply
until voting records at issue were actually in custody of the state as opposed to being in the
hands of local level officials).
129 Every state that uses voting machines maintains federally mandated pre- and postelection audit procedures and machine certification. See generally Stephen N. Goggin,
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When they were first introduced in the early 1900s, voting machines drew
much skepticism, so much so that their use was often curbed or eliminated.130
In the years since Bush v. Gore, their use has been on the rise, particularly
driven by HAVA’s federal funds to purchase new voting equipment. Two
categories of voting machines have emerged as the most prevalent: direct
recording electronic machines (DREs) and optical scan machines. In the 2012
election, approximately 39% of voters cast ballots on DREs and 56% cast
ballots on paper ballots counted on optical scanners.131 HAVA requires that all
voting machines have “audit capacity” that can produce a “permanent paper
record” for manual audit.132 Transparency advocates are quick to point out,
however, that HAVA fails to require a contemporaneous, or “voter-verified,”
paper trail.133 Consistent with Election Assistance Commission
recommendations, many state statutes require DREs to be equipped with voterverifiable, paper trail audit capacity.134 Experience has shown, however, that
audit capabilities may fall short (and can create fresh problems).135
Michael D. Byrne & Juan E. Gilbert, Post-Election Auditing: Effects of Procedure and
Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency, and Auditor Satisfaction and
Confidence, 11 ELECTION L.J. 36 (2012); Tokaji, supra note 7, at 1722; SUSANNAH
GOODMAN, MICHELLE MULDER & PAMELA SMITH, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION,
COUNTING VOTES 2012: A STATE BY STATE LOOK AT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PREPAREDNESS
1 (2012), available at http://countingvotes.org/sites/default/files/CountingVotes2012.pdf. A
full discussion of the contours of these processes is outside of the scope of this paper, which
focuses on when and under what circumstances members of the public, candidates, and the
media may access machines.
130 See ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 78 (describing alleged bribery by an early voting
machine manufacturer that led Illinois to abandon the use of electronic voting machines in
the early twentieth century). Albright describes problems with fraud and machine reliability
that hindered adoption of voting technology in elections subsequently in other states. Id. As
described by another historian of the introduction of voting machines in New Jersey in 1907,
“[m]any citizens were distressed because they could not feel assured that their vote had
actually been registered, or because they feared that the machine might err in recording the
totals.” MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 200. By 1911, 321 out of 335 election districts in
New Jersey had voted to return to the paper ballot. Id. at 201.
131 Voting Systems & Use: 1980–2012, PROCON.ORG, http://votingmachines.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=000274 (last updated Feb. 6, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/FG5G-NPXK. In 2000, approximately 12% of registered voters used DRE
machines and 31% used optical scan machines to cast their vote. Electronic Voting Offers
Opportunities and Presents Challenges, Testimony Prepared for Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 11 (2004) (statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director
Information Technology Architecture and Systems.
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 15481(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).
133 Tokaji, supra note 7, at 1733; see generally Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology
and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625 (2002).
134 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-532 (2013) (“The Secretary of State or the county shall
not purchase or procure a direct-recording electronic voting machine that does not include a
voter-verified paper audit trail.”); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19270 (West 2014) (“The Secretary of
State shall not . . . approve a direct recording electronic voting system unless [it] includes an
accessible voter verified paper audit trail.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 16-42 (West 2008) (“No
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DRE machines are designed to walk voters through the ballot more
carefully than paper ballots allow. Machine voting therefore helps ensure that
ballots are cast without error.136 Even accepting the increased voter accuracy
machines may enable,137 skeptics voice concern that voters have no means of
ensuring their vote has registered correctly.138 This has been a perennial
problem since voting machines first came on the scene.139 Concerns persist
today. Many voters during the 2012 elections complained of “vote flipping” on
DRE machines where the machine appeared to register Obama when Romney
had been selected and vice versa.140 Critics of machine voting also point to
potential for errors in coding or hacker mischief that are not entirely
unfounded.141
electronic voting system shall be used in any election unless it generates a paper ballot or
voter verifiable paper audit trail. . . .”); see also Technical Guideline Development
Committee, Recommended Guidelines Part 1: Equipment Requirements, Chapter 4: Security
ASSISTANCE
COMMISSION,
and
Audit
Architecture,
U.S.
ELECTION
http://archives.eac.gov/vvsg/part1/chapter04.php/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/9SJ6-XGWK.
135 For example, in many states the paper trail capacity consists of a printer attached to
an existing DRE with a paper spool behind a sheet of glass. During a recount or audit, voting
officials can count the records on the printer module. But the spools are continuous sheets
of paper. If a ballot is spoiled (i.e., a voter completes a ballot and then rejects it), the spoiled
ballot remains on the spool with the valid ballots. This process can lead to errors in vote
tallies if election officials erroneously include spoiled ballots in the vote tally. Election
officials complain that segregating the invalid ballots is a costly and time-consuming
process. When totals from the paper record do not match machine totals, public confidence
in the election outcome suffers. Goggin, supra note 129, at 40.
136 On a DRE, voters cannot fail to properly fill in a bubble or leave a stray mark that
confuses an optical scanner. DREs also ensure that voters do not unintentionally overvote
and may only undervote after receiving a warning they have done so. “Over voting” occurs
when a voter votes for more than one candidate in a single race. “Under voting” occurs when
a voter casts no vote in a race. Some voters fail to indicate a choice in error, other voters
consciously do not vote in some races. See Jason W. Hilliard, Punch Card Ballots v. Direct
Record Electronic Voting: Why Ohio’s Use of Different Methods to Count Ballots Violates
the Equal Protection Clause – Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004),
31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 527, 534–35 (2006).
137 See Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that voters
using touchscreen DRE machines “prevent some of the voter errors that are characteristic of
optical scan voting systems.”).
138 MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 200; see also infra note 141 (discussing modern
distrust of voting machines).
139 ALBRIGHT, supra note 22, at 78 (“Early experience with the voting
machine . . . developed well-defined objections in the minds of many voters.”).
140 Letter from John R. Phillippe, Jr., Chief Counsel, Republican National Committee to
State
Election
Officials
(Nov.
1,
2012),
available
at
http://actnow.gop.com/uploads/Letter_re_Voting_Machine_Errors.pdf (requesting that state
officials address alleged DRE vote flipping issues citing a variety of possible causes
including “miscalibration and hyper-sensitivity of the machines.”).
141 Stephanie Philips, The Risks of Computerized Election Fraud: When Will Congress
Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1123, 1141 (2006) (noting that “the
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The digitization of elections has placed stress on state election transparency
regimes. Two examples illustrate some of the complications that have arisen.
During the 2006 race for U.S. Congress in Florida’s thirteenth district, Sarasota
County’s iVotronic DRE machines lacked verified paper trails.142 When the
machine spit out the vote totals, challenger Christine Jennings trailed incumbent
Vern Buchanan by 369 votes (out of nearly a quarter million cast, a one-quarter
of one percent margin). To complicate matters, voters oddly cast 18,000
“undervotes” in the Jennings–Buchanan race (meaning no vote was recorded).
The number of undervotes was far higher than in previous elections in that
county.143 During early voting, several voters had reported “difficulties getting
their choices for Congress to register on the electronic touchscreen voting
machines.”144 What was the problem? Poor ballot design? Voters expressing
dissatisfaction with both candidates by voting for neither? A machine glitch?
The world will never know.
The narrow margin of victory triggered a manual recount145 that, in the case
of iVotronic DRE, amounted to nothing more than a printout listing the
machines’ vote totals—not a recount but a reprint quipped one observer.146
software used to run DREs should be carefully scrutinized because ‘no independent proof
can be provided to the voter that the choices have, in fact, been entered correctly’ and
because ‘[t]here are no ballots that can be recounted as a check on system correctness.’”)
(quoting ROY G. SALTMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L BUREAU OF STANDARDS,
ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY IN COMPUTERIZED VOTE-TALLYING (1988)); Mark
Clayton, Voting-Machine Glitches: How Bad Was It on Election Day Around the Country?,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Nov.
7,
2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2012/1107/Voting-machine-glitches-How-badwas-it-on-Election-Day-around-the-country, archived at http://perma.cc/F5UC-CTC4; Eric
Shawn, Claims Increase of Machines Switching Votes in Ohio, Other Battlegrounds, FOX
NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/02/claims-increasingswitched-votes-in-ohio, archived at http://perma.cc/N4W3-AUSJ; Steve Watson, Reports of
Voting Machine Problems, Vote Flipping Begin to Pour in, INFOWARS.COM (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://www.infowars.com/reports-of-voting-machine-problems-vote-flipping-begin-to-pourin/, archived at http://perma.cc/YF7V-NSA8. One of the most famous examples of hacking
into an online voting system occurred when a Michigan University student hacked a pilot
Internet voting system during a test period in Washington, D.C., making the system play the
Michigan fight song every time a vote was cast. See Mike DeBonis, Hacker Infiltration Ends
D.C. Online Voting Trial, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2010, 2:14 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/2010/10/hacker_infiltration_ends_dc_on.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/J35F-DGJB.
142 Jessica Ring Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons
from the Jennings v. Buchanan Congressional Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 397, 401 (2008).
143 In 2002 in the last mid-term election, Sarasota reported an undervote of 2.5%, in
contrast to the Jennings–Buchanan undervote total of 13.9% on election day and 17.6%
during early voting. Id. at 399.
144 Id.
145 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(1) (West 2014) (requiring recount for a margin of
victory of 0.25% or less).
146 Id.
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Unsurprisingly, vote totals remained unchanged, prompting observers to label
the recount an “an exercise in futility.”147 With no way to determine the source
of the mysteriously large undervote, Jennings pursued an ultimately
unsuccessful suit in state court and in the U.S. House of Representatives (which
holds jurisdiction for election contests in U.S. House races).148 Jennings sought
access to the hardware, software, and source code of the Sarasota machines. In
state court, Florida’s trade secret privilege thwarted Jennings’s discovery
attempts.149 A Florida circuit court denied access, holding that the producer of
the iVotronic’s trade secret protections outweighed Jennings’s right to access
materials.150 Attempts at the federal level proved similarly fruitless in
determining the actual cause of the undervote. A fifteen-month congressional
process under the Federal Contested Elections Act151 did not include forensic
review of the machines at issue, meaning the cause of the 18,000 undervotes
will never been known.152
A second example is Virginia’s statute governing recounts for DRE
machines. Some counties in Virginia use optical scan voting machines; others
use DREs. In a Virginia recount, optical scan paper ballots are recounted by
hand. The recount statute provides for a process by which DRE ballots may be
“redetermined” for recount purposes as follows:
For direct recording electronic machines . . . the recount officials shall
open the envelopes with the printouts and read the results from the printouts. If
the printout is not clear, or on the request of the court, the recount officials
shall rerun the printout from the machine or examine the counters as
appropriate.153

But the word “counter” is an anachronism. DREs do not contain counters in
the way, for example, lever machines contained mechanical, analog counters.
The entire DRE machine is, in a manner, a counter. Determining the cause of a
glitch and possibly recovering votes in a Virginia recount involving DREs could
result in as much uncertainty as Florida’s thirteenth district experienced in
2006.154
147 Jeremy Wallace, Call for Paper Trail, New Election, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE
(Nov. 16, 2006, 3:23 AM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20061116/NEWS/
611160464?p=2&tc=pg, archived at http://perma.cc/CVQ5-UZSS.
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members.”).
149 Order on Motions, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm’n of the State of Fla.,
No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 5508540 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006).
150 Id.
151 2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96 (2012).
152 H.R. REP. NO. 110-528 (2008). Florida subsequently switched to optical scan
voting. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.56075 (West 2014).
153 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-802 (2014) (emphasis added).
154 This scenario formed the basis of the May 16, 2012 Election Law Program Virginia
LAW
PROGRAM,
War
Game.
See
Virginia
War
Game,
ELECTION
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The Florida and Virginia examples illustrate that beyond problems of voter
distrust of voting technology, outdated transparency statutes can exacerbate the
problem and unnecessarily test the ability of election officials and the courts to
resolve election transparency conflicts free of political taint. Furthermore, and
almost as importantly, because electronic voting machines can remove the
possibility of manual ballot counting, electronic voting has the collateral effect
of focusing campaign and public oversight energy on other materials such as
early, mail-in, and provisional voting materials. This collateral effect
compounds transparency problems when state statutes inadequately address
these forms of voting.

C. Post-Bush v. Gore Oversight Norms
The 2000 presidential election controversy ushered in a new era in election
oversight. The drama that unfolded in Florida served as a wake up call to many
Americans that our system of elections was broken and in need of attention.
Since Bush v. Gore, this country has witnessed an explosion of interest in
election oversight. Voting rights and voting integrity groups have proliferated,
and individual citizens have become interested in monitoring elections—
particularly when elections are close.155 Election litigation has increased in
frequency and the election law bar has expanded considerably.156 In addition,
the post-Bush v. Gore oversight era coincided with a larger government
transparency movement prompted by the rise of the Internet, a technology
enabling government transparency and oversight on a scale and scope not
previously imaginable. The promise of digital transparency changes the nature
of access requests and the type and volume of data election administrators can,
and do, release. It has also magnified the public’s transparency expectations.
In the past, most election records never saw the light of day, in part because
election records were highly decentralized and in paper form. Access requests
were commonly denied due to heavy burdens on election administrators in
compiling hard copy materials—often when time was short and offices
understaffed.157 Before the 2002 Help American Vote Act, for example, states
were not required to maintain centralized voter registries and few did. Local
http://www.electionlawissues.org/War-Games/Virginia.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/5VPK-4U8W. The war game consisted of Virginia election
attorneys arguing the fully briefed fictional case before a three-judge panel. Id.
155 See, e.g., TRUE THE VOTE, https://www.truethevote.org/aboutus (last visited Aug. 18,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/59TL-EJFZ. True the Vote and dozens of voting integrity
groups have formed in states across the country. See also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Tweets
Alert Virginia Vote-Counters to Mistakes in Race, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:53 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/tweets-alert-virginia-vote-counters-tomistakes-in-race.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U47Q-JGBG.
156 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958–59 (2005)
(documenting the dramatic rise in election litigation post Bush v. Gore).
157 See, e.g., Milton v. Hayes, 770 P.2d 14, 14 (Okla. 1989).
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registrars maintained their own lists of voters, making any attempt to gather
statewide election data extremely difficult. The problem of historically poor
data on U.S. elections and election administration has been well documented.158
Today, access requests for many types of election records can (at least in
theory) be met by clicking a mouse, removing perhaps the greatest historic
barrier to election transparency. Examples of Internet-enhanced election
transparency abound. In one early instance, during the Franken recount in 2008,
the Minneapolis Star Tribune broadcast a live stream on its website of votes
being counted; in the first four days of counting, over 112,000 viewers watched
the proceedings.159 The media also affirmatively posted disputed ballots online,
allowing the public to weigh for themselves whether voter intent could be
discerned.160 During the Scott Walker recall recount in 2012, Wisconsin’s
Government Accountability Board (seen as a model for nonpartisan election
administration)161 broadcast the recount over the Internet to instill public
confidence that election officials were following the rules. In another example,
for a trial period in 2008–2009, Humboldt County, California election officials
scanned voted ballots and posted them online.162 State election administrators
are also experimenting with Internet portals for voter information such as voter
registration lists and information about mail and provisional ballot status.163
158 GERKEN, supra note 15, at 4.
159 Marisa Helms, Political Junkies Flock to Live Streaming of Senate Recount

Proceedings, MINNPOST (Dec. 22, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/12/
political-junkies-flock-live-streaming-senate-recount-proceedings,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/NKH3-S5QZ.
160 See, e.g., Than Tibbets & Steve Mullis, Challenged Ballots: You Be the Judge,
MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Dec. 3, 2008), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/
2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/, archived at http://perma.cc/M6F-VQB2 (posting disputed
ballots online for public inspection during the Franken-Coleman recount).
161 Abby Rapoport, What? There’s a Nonpartisan Way to Run Elections!?, AM.
PROSPECT (Sept. 24, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/what-theres-nonpartisan-way-runelections, archived at http://perma.cc/H3HL-P92B.
162 See HUMBOLDT COUNTY ELECTION TRANSPARENCY PROJECT,
http://humtp.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9YXX-E59P;
Adler & Hall, supra note 12, at 146.
163 For examples of web-based tools that allow voters to check the status of mail-in
SEC’Y
ST.,
ballots,
see
Track
Your
Absentee
Ballot,
IOWA
http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/absenteeballotstatus/search.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/9UT8-L44E; Vote By Mail, LA. SEC’Y STATE,
http://www.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/Vote/VoteByMail/
Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8FX-FF52; Voter Lookup, MD. ST. BD.
ELECTIONS, https://voterservices.elections.maryland.gov/VoterSearch# (last visited Oct. 22,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7CLZ-EKPB. Other states provide online portals that
allow voters to check the status of their provisional ballots. See Provisional Search, N.C. ST.
BD. ELECTIONS, https://www.ncsbe.gov/webapps/pvpinsearch/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/TS7W-F9CE; Provisional Ballot Search, W. VA. SEC’Y ST.,
https://apps.sos.wv.gov/elections/ voter/ provisional.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/PT63-ZKHE. Online campaign donation databases, such as the
Federal Election Commission, provide tools that constitute another category of internet-
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While most such efforts are intended to help individual voters track their mailin or provisional ballot status, these online systems hold the technical potential
to enable much broader public access to election records should states opt to
open them up.
As the two trends converge—more groups and individuals interested in
overseeing election processes and greater capacity of election officials to serve
up digitized election records—perhaps optimism is warranted. Have we come to
a point when absolute election transparency can replace a state’s reliance on
structured oversight? Maybe allowing access to traditional and nontraditional
voting materials to traditional and nontraditional overseers marks the real future
of election transparency. So far, however, most election officials have been
wary to embrace this future.
Colorado’s experience provides a window into some of the concerns. In
2009, controversy arose in Colorado when Marilyn Marks, the losing candidate
in the Aspen mayoral election, sued for access to digital copies of voted ballots
cast in the election she lost.164 The clerk’s office had taken extraordinary steps
to make digitized copies of voted ballots available for public inspection, briefly
displaying each of the 2,544 ballots in digital form (as TIFF files)165 on large,
public video monitors at the tabulation center.166 About a week after the
election (and after the deadline had passed to contest the result) the clerk
disclosed a discrepancy between the manual count of cast ballots and computergenerated data.167 Marks immediately filed a Colorado Open Records Act
(CORA) request for the full set of TIFF files.168 The clerk denied Marks’s
request, citing ballot secrecy concerns and a Colorado statute requiring ballots
be held for six months after elections and then destroyed.169
Marks sued. After losing in district court, the appeals court reversed. The
court of appeals held that granting Marks’s request would not compromise
secrecy in voting and that copies of the ballots, which had already been publicly

aided election transparency, but fall outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., Disclosure
Data Search, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/
disclosure_data_search.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4BEZV6M8?type=image.
164 TrueBallot, Inc., the company hired by the clerk’s office, created copies of the
ballots as “part of a computerized ballot tabulation system designed for the new instant
runoff voting (IRV) procedures of the City of Aspen.” Marks v. Koch, 284 P.3d 118, 120
(Colo. App. 2011).
165 Tagged Image File Format.
166 The clerk even broadcasted selected TIFF files on local television encouraging
public scrutiny. Marks, 284 P.3d at 120.
167 Id.
168 Teresa L. Benns, Colorado Appeals Court Decision Upholds Open Records Law,
ALAMOSA VALLEY COURIER (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.alamosanews.com/v2_news_
articles.php?heading=0&story_id=22156&page=7, archived at http://perma.cc/QQ6T-K4B9.
169 Marks, 284 P.3d at 120–21.
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disclosed, were not “ballots” under the election code and must therefore be
released to Marks.170
But the story did not end there. With an appeal to the Colorado Supreme
Court pending, election officials successfully lobbied the legislature to pass
legislation prohibiting county clerks from fulfilling a CORA request for voted
ballots during a blackout period—forty-five days before election day until the
election is certified.171 The legislation carves out an exception for “interested
parties” such as candidates and parties who may access ballots during the
blackout period. Critics of the legislation decried the creation of a “privileged
class” of persons who could access the materials. Governor Hickenlooper
signed the bill nevertheless in June 2012, and it remains on the books today.172
As states struggle to adapt to increasing pressure for transparency of
nontraditional voting materials from nontraditional oversight groups and amidst
fast-changing technical realities, election transparency statutes often prove
inadequate. Access disputes threaten the stability of outcomes, the neutrality of
the judiciary, and the ability of election administrators to run elections
smoothly. Transparency rules that fail to address changed circumstances
weaken public confidence in electoral outcomes. The next section examines
how policymakers might respond to these challenges and suggests possible
paths forward.

IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: REFORMING ELECTION TRANSPARENCY
Transparency rules must adapt to changing circumstances. This section
explores how in four parts. The first examines whether states should constrict
who may access election materials, concluding that “structured oversight” is
neither desirable nor possible. The second section surveys current thinking on
the dangers of transparency and considers scholarship that aims to improve
transparency regimes by taking these dangers into account. The third section
suggests reforms that might curb the negative impacts of greater election
transparency. And the final section presents a case study to test these theories.

A. A Return to Structured Oversight?
Some might argue the best way forward is to look back, returning to
Progressive Era-styled structured oversight. The Colorado legislature’s choice
to limit access to voted ballots to candidates and parties provides one example
of a state choosing this direction. One could imagine states turning to this
solution for other kinds of voting materials. States might decide that only
170 Id. at 124
171 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-205.5 (2014).
172 Editorial: A Step Back on Colorado Election Rules, DENVER POST (June 12, 2012,

5:42 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_20834247/editorial-step-back-election-rules,
archived at http://perma.cc/4989-KX82 (arguing that the creation of a privileged class of
access is misguided).
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candidates and their representatives can access provisional or mail-in voting
lists, voter histories, poll book data, voter registration materials, and so forth.
There are several reasons why this approach might be beneficial. First, much
like the adversarial system in our judiciary, the parties will serve as vigilant
proxies for the public. Parties and candidates have strong reasons to make sure
that only eligible voters are registered, that election technology is functioning,
that election day processes are carried out according to the rules, and that
counting is fair, accurate, and honest.173
Second, a party or candidate-led system of oversight is easier for election
officials to administer. Rather than handling access requests from numerous
(even multitudes of) requestors, limiting access to parties and candidates
narrows the number of access requests to a manageable few. Restricting
oversight access to parties and candidates enables election administrators to
retain high levels of transparency without sacrificing dignity and decorum in the
process. A free-for-all model of access risks exposing elections to morass,
uncertainty, and delay. In addition, those few granted access are accountable,
known actors. Restricting access to parties and candidates allows election
administrators to impose standards on behavior and on the use of information
released to protect election integrity and voter privacy—a growing concern in
the age of Big Data.174
While tempting, particularly for those who crave order in what feels like an
increasingly chaotic electoral process, the drawbacks of structured oversight are
many. A first issue is information asymmetry. As is often the case, if one
campaign or party has better political information about the voting public or is
more technologically sophisticated, access to election information can result in
the voters of one party or candidate having an advantage over the other. A stark
example of this is Minnesota’s Franken–Coleman recount in 2008. According to
one observer, Franken’s attorneys far outmatched Coleman’s team in data
sophistication. Franken’s attorneys had “computer geeks” sitting nearby as they
figured out which mail-in ballots to challenge.175 Information asymmetries will
likely decrease going forward as both parties are now actively engaged in
173 We rely on adverse interested parties to act as proxies for the public interest in many
settings. For example, we promote corporate competition through antitrust laws for the
benefit of consumers. See generally Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012) (prohibiting
activities that restrict competition in the marketplace).
174 See generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014). Some states are reacting to voter privacy concerns. Utah, for
example, is considering legislation that would allow voters to request that their voter
information be kept private. Lee Davidson, Bill to Keep Utah Voter Data Private Passes
House, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/
57596888-90/bill-data-edwards-information.html.csp, archived at http://perma.cc/U2PUEKSU.
175 WEINER, supra note 84, at 133 (“More than once, voting officials and Coleman reps
witnessed Franken lawyers check with staff members— ‘computer geeks’ . . . —who sorted
through voter data information on their laptops. In a few cases, the staffer with the computer
gave a thumbs-up or thumbs-down to the Franken lawyer, and a decision was made.”).
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vigorous political data efforts.176 Yet in smaller races, in instances when
national and state parties decide against devoting significant resources to datadriven decision making—and for races involving less sophisticated third
parties—information asymmetries will persist. Relatedly, the adversarial system
can pit well-funded candidates against candidates who lack resources to
undertake expensive oversight operations, which can require paid staff and
hundreds of volunteers. Particularly in state and local level races (and races with
poorly-funded third parties), resource asymmetries can translate to a breakdown
in adversarial oversight.177
A second problem with structured access is what can be termed “loser
distortion.” Losing candidates and parties, far from seeking to ensure that
elections are being run legitimately, have a huge incentive to demonstrate the
exact opposite. The more doubt the losing candidate can cast on the propriety of
an election process the better. Partisan oversight can fuel mutual distrust, can be
wasteful, and can threaten election decorum. After all, partisans are not after the
truth; they want to “get their guy in.” This phenomenon is well-documented.178
Not allowing a wide range of observers, such as members of the press and
public, access to confirm or disprove such allegations will exacerbate public
distrust of electoral outcomes.179
Finally, perhaps the most persuasive argument against structured oversight
is that it may well be impossible to put the toothpaste back in the tube. Limiting
access to only candidate and party representatives is increasingly unacceptable
to advocacy groups, the media, and others interested in overseeing elections.
Although restricting oversight access to political party and candidate
representatives has been the norm for decades, the norm is fast unraveling as
176 See, e.g., John Nichols, Not Just the NSA: Politicians Are Data Mining the American

Electorate, NATION (June 11, 2013, 11:26 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/174759/notjust-nsa-politicians-are-data-mining-american-electorate#, archived at http://perma.cc/
R3AP-DL9A (describing sophisticated data mining efforts by both the Republican and
Democratic Parties); Rubinstein, supra note 174.
177 This phenomenon played out dramatically in the Cochran-McDaniel primary runoff
in Mississippi discussed below. In the aftermath of that race, McDaniel, a Tea Party
challenger to a six-term U.S. Senator, faced serious financial challenges when attempting to
identify illegal crossover votes after the election. Sam R. Hall, Hall: McDaniel Campaign in
LEDGER
(July
6,
2014,
3:03
PM),
Financial
Straits,
CLARION
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/07/05/hall-mcdanielcampaign-financial-straits/12260883/, archived at http://perma.cc/74YG-D3U8. However,
whether or not outside groups could assist the McDaniel campaign in post-election oversight
became a litigated question. See infra Part IV.D.
178 See HASEN, supra note 3, at ix; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6
(1996) (commenting on the adversarial system in the justice system, “polarized debate
distorts the truth, leaves out important information, simplifies complexity, and obfuscates
rather than clarifies.”) (footnotes omitted)).
179 Then again, outside groups may be just as dedicated to distorting the truth as
political parties and campaigns—in some cases even more so.
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technology enables ordered access and the open government movement gains
steam.
In the past, the government’s interest in confining access to a limited few
was often compelling given the practical realities of the day. For example, when
the information being sought must be acquired in person (e.g., viewing counting
tables during ballot counting), allowing too many bodies in the room is
unworkable. Concern about preserving original documents is another
example.180 Technology increasingly renders these concerns moot.181 Cameras
can be mounted and live feeds posted online to allow as many observers to
watch ballot counts as are interested.182 Original materials can be copied and
distributed digitally without harming original documents.
Frustrated by structured transparency regimes when old justifications often
no longer hold water, numerous individuals and groups have challenged
structured oversight laws. The KnowCampaign v. Rodrigues provides an
example.183 In that case, a nonprofit group sought access to voter history
records.184 The Virginia statute allowed only candidates, elected officials, and
political party chairmen access to voter history lists.185 The KnowCampaign
brought suit claiming that the denial of access constituted a violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.186 The circuit court judge
agreed, finding no compelling interest served by the government’s restriction of
disclosure to political parties and candidates only.187
Instead of seeing broad oversight by many different groups as a hindrance,
perhaps we should welcome this trend. Understaffed and under-budgeted
election offices (and underfunded local or third-party candidates) can arguably
use the help. Knowing that various groups are fully engaged in oversight—for
180 See, e.g., Kibort v. Westrom, 862 N.E.2d 609, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that

interest in preserving unspoiled ballots outweighed access interest); State ex rel. Roussel v.
St. John the Baptist Parish Sch. Bd., 135 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (concerning
the preservation of ballots).
181 The same can be said of allowing TV cameras in the courtroom, a practice that
courts commonly refused to allow before cameras could be deployed without disruption. See
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (describing the disruption of TV cameras in the
courtroom: “[c]ables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones
were on the judge’s bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. It is
conceded that the activities of the television crews and news photographers led to
considerable disruption of the hearings.”). Once technology advanced such that cameras
posed no threat of disruption, that argument fell. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 576
(1981).
182 See Marks v. Koch, 284 P.3d 118, 120 (Colo. App. 2011).
183 See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of another example, True the Vote v. Hosemann,
No. 34–CV–532–NFA, 2014 WL 4273332 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014).
184 KnowCampaign v. Rodrigues, No. CL10-3425, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010).
185 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-406(a) (2014).
186 Complaint at 7–8, KnowCampaign v. Rodrigues, No. CL10-3425 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2010).
187 See KnowCampaign, No. CL10-3425, at 10.
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example, through online crowdsourced vetting of voter lists,188 recount
processes,189 or petition signature validity190—can provide a measure of
comfort as election administrators struggle to do the best they can with limited
resources.191 Broad public scrutiny of elections can also help local registrars
identify and rectify problems in real time. We have seen perhaps no better
example of this play out than David Wasserman’s tweeting effort during the
canvass in the 2013 Virginia attorney general’s race.192 Wasserman, a Virginia
political blogger, mounted a tweeting effort that consolidated on-the-ground
reports from observers, citizens, and election officials. The media, the
candidates, election officials, and the public at large scrutinized Wasserman’s
Twitter feed. It became the go-to information source during the canvas. Many
believe Wasserman’s efforts lead to the discovery of missed ballots and
ultimately, some argue, a more accurate final count. Wasserman explained his
surprise at Virginia election officials’ reaction to his tweeting: “I was expecting
them to say, ‘Stop denigrating our electoral process.’ Instead they said, ‘I want
to thank you for the public service you’re doing.’”193 Close, broad-based
scrutiny may enhance efficient resolution of election irregularities.
For the reasons above, permitting access to election materials to outside
groups may have cost and efficiency benefits. The opposite, however, could
equally be true. Too many eyes sifting through election material has the
potential to increase costs to election administrators, decrease efficiency, or
worse, damage public confidence in election outcomes. Making election
information available too broadly can backfire if doing so gives rise to
confusion, conspiracy theories, inaccurate portrayals or distortion of data, or
threats to individual voting rights. This impulse has perpetuated structured
oversight regimes.194

188 Justin Levitt, The Danger of Voter Fraud Vigilantes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012,
9:17 PM), http:// campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/the-danger-of-voter-fraudvigilantes/, archived at http://perma.cc/DM6J-FVG5.
189 Recall
Election
Information,
WIS.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
BD.,
http://gab.wi.gov/elections-voting/recall, archived at http://perma.cc/W8U5-ZCQS (last
visited Oct. 5, 2014).
190 Rebecca Green, Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 367,
382 (2013) (discussing privacy concerns associated with publication of petition signatories).
191 The obvious counterargument here is that when outside groups vet voter lists, they
cause more work, not less, for election workers and often falsely challenge voters. See
Levitt, supra note 188 (describing mass public challenges to voter eligibility by “amateur
sleuths” being, in the end, “predictably replete with error” and resulting in few legitimate
challenges).
192 Davis, supra note 155.
193 Id.
194 See Susan Ferguson Chance & Colleen Connolly-Ahern, A Vote of Confidence?
Florida’s Public Records Law and the 2000 Presidential Election Recounts: Could It
Happen in Any Other State?, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 139 (2001).
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B. Against Transparency?
A version of this impulse prompts some to conclude that government
transparency has a dark side, giving rise a growing sense that the drive to put
any and all government data online could undermine the very confidence in
government it is meant to inspire.195 Some voice concern that “[w]e are not
thinking critically enough about where and when transparency works, and
where and when it may lead to confusion, or to worse.”196 Especially when
government data contains inaccuracies, when it is not contextualized, and when
data users fail to take the time reach accurate conclusions, broad data disclosure
threatens to do more harm than good.197
Building on important work sorting through effective and ineffective
transparency regimes,198 one way to think about transparency in election
administration is to start by making a distinction between transparency that
helps election administrators and legislators improve election processes
(management transparency) and transparency measures that enable observers to
verify voter eligibility and election outcomes (outcome transparency). While the
line between the two is admittedly fuzzy, management transparency in elections
would consist of election data that afford both the public and election officials
the ability to evaluate election processes and their successes and shortcomings
before, during, and after elections. Much thoughtful work has been done on
improving management transparency in elections. In Evaluating Elections, R.
Michael Alvarez, Lonna Rae Atkenson, and Thad V. Hall argue convincingly
for increased performance-based evaluation of election administration.199 They
believe that the success of election administration can and should be measured
to improve election efficiency and public confidence in outcomes. The authors
argue that states should cull data before, during, and after elections that helps
evaluate topics such as:
• “How many people were turned away from the polls or voted
provisionally? . . .
195 See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE

PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 177–80 (2007) (describing the real risks broad
disclosure can engender); Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9,
2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency, archived at
http://perma.cc/GW8B-W59X.
196 See Lessig, supra note 195.
197 Id. Some have raised concerns about too much transparency in the campaign finance
realm as well. See Hasen, supra note 14, at 558–59. These same concerns, interestingly,
have prompted U.S. Supreme Court justices to refuse to allow cameras to record oral
argument at the Court. Exclaimed Justice Souter, “I can tell you the day you see a camera
come into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead body.” On Cameras in Supreme
Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-court-souter-says-over-mydead-body.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ECV6-NR99.
198 FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 195, at 6.
199 ALVAREZ, ATKESON & HALL, supra note 15, at 1–9.
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• Did the poll workers report problems in the election? . . .
• Did the machines count votes correctly?
• What was the roll-off on down ballot races?”200
According to Alvarez, Atkenson, and Hall, answers to questions such as
these will help election administrators improve elections and will help the
public evaluate how well (or poorly) elections are run.201
Others have called for increased management transparency in elections.
One early thought leader is Heather Gerken at Yale. Gerken argued in her 2009
book The Democracy Index that more election data would lead to better-run
elections.202 Gerken suggested that election data could spur state rankings on
various aspects of election performance, exposing what works and what does
not.203 Data-based rankings would then push state election administrators to try
and “keep up with the Joneses,” improving overall election management
countrywide.204
Pew’s Election Performance Index, released in 2013, makes Gerken’s idea a
reality.205 The index uses management data to measure election performance
according to seventeen measurable indicators such as polling place wait times
and ballot rejection rates. 206 To create it, Pew collected data from a variety of
sources, including: the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey Voting
and Registration Supplement, Election Assistance Commission surveys, and
other surveys and studies.207 The result is impressive—amounting to a thorough
numbers-based evaluation of state election ecosystems.
Increased management transparency in elections offers promise even
beyond Gerken’s vision. Election management data accessible in machinereadable format could allow developers to create a variety of applications that
assist the smooth functioning of elections from voter registration interfaces to
voting efficiency to improvements in voter education on substantive election
questions.208 Examples of the power of open data in elections are apps that
200 Id. at 3. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but rather offered as examples of the
kinds of data and information that should be transparent in a management transparency
model.
201 Id.
202 GERKEN, supra note 15, at 5–6.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 6 (“A ranking should work for the simplest of reasons: no one wants to be at
the bottom of the list.”).
205 Elections Performance Index, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001/01/01/electionsperformance-index, archived at http://perma.cc/GD8R-4HEJ.
206 Heather Gerken, Gerken: Pew’s Election Performance Index, ELECTION LAW BLOG
(Feb. 10, 2013, 9:05 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=47114, archived at
http://perma.cc/8DR9-A8RW.
207 See Elections Performance Index, supra note 205.
208 See Harlan Yu & David G. Robinson, The New Ambiguity of “Open
Government,” 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 178, 180 (2012), available at
http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/59-11.pdf.
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assist voters in locating their polling place, determine levels of local polling
place congestion on election day, and help voters learn about ballot initiatives
and candidates (lessening time spent in the voting booth and thus shortening
wait times on election day).209

C. Addressing Outcome Transparency
If management transparency in elections furthers the goal of increasing
election efficiency and improving election processes, what does election
outcome transparency look like, what are its dangers, and how can election
officials temper its negative effects? Outcome transparency can be thought of as
any oversight action aimed at verifying the accuracy of an election outcome.
This can range from efforts to verify that individual voters are U.S. citizens or
that a single voter has not cast ballots in multiple states. Outcome transparency
would also encompass efforts on election day to oversee the voting process to
make sure election officials do not turn away eligible voters. Outcome
transparency would also include efforts after votes are cast to audit machines or
examine absentee ballots or lists of provisional voters to ensure no ineligible
votes are counted. Outcome transparency trains its sights on ensuring that only
eligible voters voted, that the system did not prevent eligible voters from casting
ballots, and that all legal ballots were included in the count.
What are the dangers of outcome transparency? Professor Justin Levitt of
Loyola Law School supplied an example on the eve of the 2012 election. Levitt
called attention to mass-challenge efforts by amateur “voting integrity sleuths”
scouring state voter registration databases to unearth illegal registrants.210 Levitt
documents, however, that such challenges very often jeopardize the rights of
legally registered voters.211 Sleuths based their challenges on mismatches
between voter registration information and information in other public
209 Seth Cline, Top 10 Smartphone Apps for the 2012 Campaign, US NEWS (Aug. 9,
2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/09/top-10-smartphoneapps-for-the-2012-campaign, archived at http://perma.cc/TK9V-VLYP (listing the top ten
election apps for 2012 for following campaigns, tracking state legislatures, and reviewing
polling data); Johanna Ambrosio, Tracy Mayor, Barbara Krasnoff & Valerie Potter, Election
Fever: 6 Mobile Apps That Can Keep You Informed, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 10, 2012, 6:45
AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9224069/Election_fever_6_mobile_apps_
that_can_keep_you_informed, archived at http://perma.cc/W8LD-XU7V (providing
information on the candidates, campaigns, and news coverage); Gary Scharrer, Voters Urged
to ‘Make Your Mark on Texas,’ HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://blog.chron.com/texaspolitics/
2012/04/voters-urged-to-make-your-mark-on-texas/,
archived at http://perma.cc/4E4Y-4TVU (discussing the still live VoteTexas app which
provides information like when, where, and how to vote); Voting and Elections, CABARRUS
COUNTY, http://www.cabarruscounty.us/resident/Pages/Elections.aspx (last visited Oct. 22,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/795Q-HCLR (providing an app that shows map of
election polling places).
210 Levitt, supra note 188.
211 Id.
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documents (for example inconsistencies in address information).212 Levitt
cautioned that amateur sleuths might unwittingly do more harm than good.213
Time and again in the election context, allegations of fraud and illegally
registered voters turn out “false positives,” fuel misinformation and
misperception, and waste state resources.214 Seen in this light, outcome
transparency in elections is transparency that enables members of the public to
expose fraud, disqualify voters, or otherwise discredit elections without
sufficient evidence. Outcome transparency in elections can be harmful because
it empowers users of data—who may take the data out of context, purposefully
distort the data, or otherwise misinterpret data—to threaten the rights of eligible
voters, the legitimacy of elected candidates, and the public’s confidence in
elections generally.
It does not follow, however, that just because election records can be
misused or create confusion they should therefore be hidden from public view.
One problem is the practical difficultly of disaggregating management data
from outcome data, allowing public access to one but not the other. Another is
that in many instances state and federal law mandate public access to records
that can be used for outcome-challenging purposes.215 Instead of denying access
or resorting to structured oversight policies, perhaps a more targeted approach is
advised.
In their 2007 book, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of
Transparency, Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil surveyed
transparency policies in a wide range of government and private settings. They
concluded that the common wisdom that more transparency is always better is
shortsighted and in many cases wrong. Instead the authors argue that
policymakers should engage in what they term “targeted transparency,”
thoughtful disclosure aimed at serving specific policy goals.216 The authors call
for careful design of transparency interfaces to ensure that users can
212 Id.
213 Id. In one of Levitt’s examples, amateur sleuths challenged a registrant based on a

missing comma. Id.
214 JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD 4
(2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20
Voter%20Fraud.pdf (discussing instances of alleged voter fraud and the paltry number of
proven cases); David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 496
(2008).
215 E.g., National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (2012) (“Each State
shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public inspection and, where
available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of
programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of
official lists of eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to
register to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular
voter is registered.”). In another example, as noted above, many state laws require public
access to lists of voters requesting and casting early and mail-in ballots. See supra note 92.
216 FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 195, at 6.
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comprehend and compare information and put data in context. The authors also
argue for mechanisms to ensure that the data are accurate, that data subjects can
correct data about them, and that the data source incorporates mechanisms for
data analysis and user feedback.217
Fung, Graham and Weil’s conclusions do not map perfectly onto the
election transparency landscape. The systems they studied largely focused on
transparency aimed at improving individual decision making—which products
to buy (consumer transparency), which hospitals to seek care from (patient
safety information), who to vote for (campaign finance disclosure), and so forth.
The main goal of election administration transparency is not to enable improved
citizen decision making but, as established above, to ensure that citizens have
faith in electoral outcomes. Still, although the goals are different, the idea of
targeting transparency does helpful work.
Using targeted transparency ideas as a basis, several specific policy
recommendations to increase the benefits of management transparency and
lessen the negative impacts of outcome transparency come into focus. First,
states should strive to improve their election information architectures. Fung,
Graham, and Weil advise that transparency works best when the entity
disclosing data provides information that is easy for ordinary citizens to use and
understand.218 To that end, election administrators should take steps that range
from improving database design and election data user interfaces to enabling
registered voters to easily update and correct their own voter information. Some
states are already doing important work improving voter interfaces with election
data. Colorado, for example, just released a new website called ACE
(Accountability in Colorado Elections).219 The site sorts election administration
data by county into a series of interactive maps, charts, and tables. While this
data has long been publicly available, it was practically inaccessible. Anyone
who wanted to access this information before would have had to visit dozens of
websites and election offices to collect it.220 Other states have invested in
improving quality and accuracy by creating online portals that allow voters to
register online, correct voter registration information, and determine the status
of ballots cast.221
217 Id. at 177–80.
218 FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 195, at 8 (describing public disclosure of

drinking water safety data that was overly-technical, inaccurate, and out-of-date). The result
was public confusion and increased health risks for consumers who relied on the data
released. Id.
219 ACCOUNTABILITY COLO. ELECTIONS, http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/
ACE/home.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/43XA-U38P.
220 Doug Chapin, Colorado Opens Its Books to the People and Data Geeks,
ELECTIONLINEWEEKLY (Aug. 8, 2014), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2014/
08/electionlineweekly_colorado_op.php.
221 See supra note 163. According to a recent survey, twenty states currently offer
online registration and another four states have passed legislation to create online voter
registration interfaces. Some online registration systems provide mechanisms for registered
voters to correct voter registration information. See Online Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF.
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Second, states should ensure that when the eligibility of registered voters is
challenged—whether by amateur sleuths, through the state’s own efforts to
cleanse its list, or in a post-election context where mail-in or provisional votes
are questioned—voters should receive adequate notice in ample time to rectify
problems. The National Voter Registration Act provides a model, requiring that
before a state may remove a voter from its voter database, the state must mail a
notice to the voter informing the voter how to update his or her voter
registration and advising the voter how to proceed upon change of address.222
HAVA provides a further example in the case of provisional ballots. After a
voter casts a provisional ballot, HAVA requires that states provide a
mechanism, such as a website or a toll-free hotline that allows the provisional
voter an opportunity to confirm that her vote counted.223
And third, rather than denying public access to voting materials altogether
or relying on structured access policies, states should open their new-andimproved books to all comers. Improved data interfaces and redaction mitigates
the risk of wide-open access. But relying on improved election data should not
be the end of the story. States should impose consequences for misuse of
election information. Frivolous challenges to voter eligibility should result in
sanctions, and subsequent denial of access to election materials for actors with a
history of misuse of data. The idea of imposing penalties to discourage bad
behavior and encourage good behavior is a model used in numerous contexts.
Rule 11(b) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, discourages
frivolous lawsuits by imposing costs on parties bringing them forward.224 Under
Rule 11(b), those filing suit in federal court certify that, inter alia, to the best of
their knowledge the suit is not being filed for an improper purpose and that the
factual contentions have evidentiary support.225 Sanctions are levied against

ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/electronic-or-online-voter-registration.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/B2W54ERA?type=image (noting that in New Mexico and Ohio voters can update an existing voter
registration online).
222 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(d)(2) (2012).
223 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(5)(B) (2012).
224 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
225 Id. (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is
not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual
contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.”).
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those filing improper or frivolous suits.226 Why not impose a version of Rule
11(b) to combat the negative impacts of outcome transparency? Rather than fret
about whether releasing election materials to outside groups will threaten
eligible voters’ legitimate voting rights or result in bad faith efforts to
undermine public faith in election outcomes, put the burden on the group using
the data to use it responsibly.227
The idea of punishing individuals and groups for interfering with the right
to vote or undermining elections is not a new one. Several states have rules on
the books that punish anyone who knowingly challenges a person’s right to vote
on fraudulent or spurious grounds—often levying criminal sanctions for such
action.228 The innovation here is: (1) tying increased access to improved
election data to sanctions for its misuse, and (2) broadening the sanction not just
for interference with the right to vote, but also for harms like violating voter
privacy and misrepresenting data to undermine the legitimacy of election
outcomes.
Applying these ideas to a real-world case study, the 2014 Mississippi
Republican primary runoff provides interesting fodder these suggestions.

D. Case Study: True the Vote v. Hosemann
In the lead up to the June 2014 Republican primary runoff election for Thad
Cochran’s U.S. Senate seat in Mississippi, Tea Party challenger Chris McDaniel
226 The Driver Privacy Protection Act provides another example of a statute that

includes a penalty for misuse of government data. The Act provides that “[a] person who
knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a
purpose not permitted [by this statute] shall be liable to the individual to whom the
information pertains.” Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (2012).
227 If states are concerned that those requesting access will leave the state or otherwise
fail to pay fines, states could adopt a model similar to criminal bonds whereby those
requesting access must post an “Access Bond” the state will retain for a specific period until
it can be assured that the requestor did not misuse the information.
228 E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18543(a) (West 2014) (“Every person who knowingly
challenges a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent or spurious
grounds, or who engages in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters
solely for the purpose of preventing voters from voting or to delay the process of voting, or
who fraudulently advises any person that he or she is not eligible to vote or is not registered
to vote when in fact that person is eligible or is registered . . . is punishable by imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than 12 months or in the state prison.”); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 204C.035(1) (West 2009) (“No person shall knowingly deceive another person regarding
the time, place, or manner of conducting an election or the qualifications for or restrictions
on voter eligibility for an election, with the intent to prevent the individual from voting in
the election. A violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor.”). Some state statutes
prohibit false challenges to voter eligibility without explicit criminal sanction. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-232(b) (West 2014) (“Challenges shall not be made indiscriminately
and may only be made if the challenger knows, suspects or reasonably believes such a
person not to be qualified and entitled to vote. Any challenge by an elector and the statement
of the person challenged shall be under oath, administered by the moderator.”).
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seemed poised to beat the six-term senator.229 On the heels of Eric Cantor’s
historic loss to a virtually unknown Tea Party challenger in Virginia a few
weeks before, Cochran had every reason to worry.230 In an effort to keep his
seat, Senator Cochran adopted a controversial strategy—wooing Democratic
voters to cast ballots on his behalf in the Republican primary.231 When the
counting was complete, Senator Cochran had pulled out a win by over 6,700
votes, a lead many attributed to crossover Democratic voters.232 Infuriated by
the tactic, McDaniel refused to concede, vowing to scour the rolls in search of
illegal votes.233
Mississippi law allows crossover voting, but does not allow voters to cast
ballots in both party primaries. 234 Ballots cast by voters in the Republican
primary who had already cast ballots in the earlier Democratic primary would

229 See Curtis Wilkie, The Last Southern Gentleman, POLITICO (June 24, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-last-gentleman108228_Page2.html#.U_9LTVYf-lI, archived at http://perma.cc/5YK5-64X8 (“So this year,
Thad is left with a following that is loving and loyal, but he is confronted with an opposition
that is passionate. His friends are not optimistic.”).
230 John Harwood, How Thad Cochran Is Trying to Avoid Eric Cantor’s Fate, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/upshot/how-thad-cochran-istrying-to-avoid-eric-cantors-fate.html?abt=0002&abg=0, archived at http://perma.cc/PF9QJNYV (“That strategy needs to work for Mr. Cochran to avoid the fate of Eric
Cantor. . . . History suggests a vast majority of people won’t bother to vote for this sort of
intraparty contest—no matter how much attention it gets. . . .”).
231 See Josh Kraushaar, Cochran’s Secret Weapon: Democratic Voters, NATIONAL
JOURNAL (June 24, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/cochran-s-secretweapon-democratic-voters-20140624, archived at http://perma.cc/BGH-8J74.
232 2014 Republican Primary Run off Results, MISS. SEC’Y STATE (July 10, 2014),
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Pages/Results-2014-republican-Primary-RunOff.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/9A9A-6NWB.
233 See Geoff Pender, Deborah Barfield Berry & Dustin Barnes, Cochran Wins Runoff;
McDaniel Refuses to Concede, Plans Challenge, CLARION-LEDGER (June 25, 2014, 7:00
AM),
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/24/cochran-defeatsmcdaniel/11341509/, archived at http://perma.cc/HK2C-EL8V.
234 Mississippi law prohibits voters from casting ballots in primaries for candidates they
did not intend to vote for in the general election. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-575 (West
2012) (“No person shall be eligible to participate in any primary election unless he intends to
support the nominations made in the primary in which he participates.”). Several
commentators opined that McDaniel would have a tough time disqualifying votes under the
statute because he would have to find Democratic voters willing to go on record on
McDaniel’s behalf stating that they violated Mississippi law. E.g., Rick Hasen, What’s Next
for McDaniel After Apparent Loss But No Concession in #MSSEN Race? The Courts?,
ELECTION LAW BLOG (June 24, 2014, 9:15 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=62735,
archived at http://perma.cc/6QE3-JANA. Another perhaps more viable avenue was to
disqualify voters by proving they had cast ballots in the Democratic primary two weeks
earlier. See Alexandra Jaffe, The Defiant Mississippi Loser, THE HILL (July 1, 2014, 6:20
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/senate-races/211127-the-defiant-mississippi-loser,
archived at http://perma.cc/XU5P-8PVN.
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be disqualified. Under Mississippi’s structured oversight regime,235 McDaniel
sent representatives to pore over election records throughout Mississippi to
determine whether enough double votes had been cast to warrant filing a
contest. Cochran likewise launched his own investigation to defend his lead.
Mississippi’s election code is vague with respect to who may access
election materials and when. While Mississippi’s statute clearly confines
inspection of cast ballots to candidates and their representatives,236 it makes no
specific mention of access to other kinds of election materials. Mississippi’s
public records statute, however, is quite broad, proclaiming that all public
records are “public property” that any person should have the right to inspect.237
This lack of clear statutory command created confusion when the Texasbased conservative voter integrity group True the Vote (TTV) sought access to
election records in an effort to see for itself whether election irregularities had
occurred. When TTV representatives sought access to election materials at
county election clerks’ offices, they were met with mixed results. Some
counties denied TTV access altogether.238 Others permitted access to certain
information, but insisted that TTV pay for nonpublic voter information to be
redacted, citing Mississippi open records laws protecting personal information
of Mississippi citizens.239
In its complaint before the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of
Mississippi, TTV claimed its right to access poll books, voter registration
applications, absentee voting envelopes, absentee ballot applications, voter rolls
and other documents had been violated.240 TTV asserted that the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA) required access because it mandates that states make
available for public inspection “all records concerning the implementation of
programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and
currency of official lists of eligible voters.”241 TTV claimed that the NVRA
thus required the state to grant TTV access to a range of election materials—not
just voter registration materials—on the theory that those materials are all
“records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted
235 MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-575(1) (West 2012).
236 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-271(1) (West 2012) (“The state executive committee of

any political party authorized to conduct political party primaries shall form an election
integrity assurance committee for each congressional district.”).
237 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 25-61-5 (West 2013) (“[A]ll public records are hereby declared
to be public property, and any person shall have the right to inspect, copy or mechanically
reproduce or obtain a reproduction of any public record of a public body in accordance with
reasonable written procedures. . . .”).
238 Complaint ¶¶ 35–38, True the Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14CV532 HTW-LRA
(S.D. Miss. July 9, 2014).
239 MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-5(2) (West 2013) (“public agency shall be entitled to
charge a reasonable fee for the redaction of any exempted material, not to exceed the
agency’s actual cost.”).
240 Complaint ¶ 16, True the Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14CV532HTW-LRA.
241 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (2012).
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for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible
voters.”242 The state pushed back, citing its own data privacy rules.243
True the Vote did not emerge victorious on its claims.244 Setting aside the
merits, as a policy matter, are we happier leaving oversight of Mississippi’s
exceptional election to the candidates to duke it out? Should structured
transparency run its course? Does it matter that one candidate, as a sitting U.S.
senator, has a resource advantage over a relatively unknown third-party
candidate? Or, should Mississippi’s statutes be rewritten to allow outside groups
like TTV access too? For reasons stated in Part IV.A above, clinging to
structured oversight is a losing proposition if the goal is to promote confidence
in election outcomes. Restricting access to parties and candidates—especially
when the race involved a third party and allegations of irregularities and
tampering swarmed—severely undermines public confidence in the integrity of
Cochran’s win and feeds conspiracy theories about the political motivations of
election officials and judges. Restricting access to election materials leaves
many Mississippi voters to doubt the legitimacy of their elected representative,
and may dampen Mississippi voters’ future enthusiasm to participate in
elections. Shutting outside groups out of the process provokes distrust; if
ensuring the election’s legitimacy is Mississippi’s goal, the state should have
made the full panoply of election records available to anyone and everyone
interested in taking a look.
But the recommendation cannot end there. Mississippi election officials can
take numerous steps to stave off the negative impacts of outcome transparency
in the future. First, Mississippi should ensure that its outcome transparency
rules anticipate access requests for different kinds of election records by a full
range of actors. Regardless of whether the state decides to continue its
structured access regime or if it decides to open its election records more
broadly (or chooses different approaches for different kinds of records at
different stages in the election process), Mississippi’s transparency statutes
should include transparency rules for materials associated with new forms of
voting and digitized election records, and they should make clear who can
242 Id.
243 Mississippi law provides that “[s]ocial security numbers, telephone numbers and

date of birth and age information in statewide, district, county and municipal
voter registration files . . . shall not be subject to inspection, examination, copying or
reproduction. . . .” MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-165(6)(a) (West 2014). Mississippi’s Open
Records Act requires parties inspecting records to bear the cost of redacting “exempted,”
identifying information from voter rolls. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-5(2) (West 2013)
(“[P]ublic agency shall be entitled to charge a reasonable fee for the redaction of any
exempted material, not to exceed the agency’s actual cost.”).
244 On August 29, 2014, Judge Nancy Atlas denied TTV’s motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, rejecting the claim that the NVRA disclosure
provisions encompass the range of materials TTV sought. True The Vote v. Hosemann, No.
3:14–CV–00532–NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *31 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014). The
Republican Party sought Rule 11 sanctions against TTV to reimburse its attorney’s fees, a
request the court denied. As of this writing, the ruling has not been appealed.
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access what and when. Second, and relatedly, is the urgency of establishing
clear transparency rules before the fact, well before elections take place. Clear
rules in effect well before election day would have gone far to instill public
confidence that partisan motives did not taint access decisions.
Third, Mississippi should make improvements to its information
architecture that make voting materials easy to access and easy to understand.
On this front Mississippi has a lot of work to do. Others have already called
attention to the poor state of Mississippi’s election data. Pew’s Election
Performance Index, for example, rated Mississippi’s election data quality as the
second lowest in the country.245 What if Mississippi election administrators had
created a voter information system that indicated, in a centralized and publicly
accessible online database, which voters had voted in which primaries?246
Anyone could sign on to see whether double voting took place or challenge
voters’ eligibility to vote for other valid reasons. Mississippi’s online database
might also contain a notice mechanism, whereby a voter whose registration or
ballot (including mail-in or provisional ballot) is challenged would receive
automatic notice and be afforded an opportunity to correct any errors through an
easy-to-use website interface or in person at a clerk’s office. Mississippi might
also consider baking into its voter records management system voter privacy
protections by, for example, creating a mechanism that automatically redacts
certain personal information before records are released.
Aside from making changes and improvements to its information
architecture, the state could combat misuse by implementing a Rule 11(b)-like
sanctions regime for misuse of election data.247 With increased access to
election materials should come increased responsibility. Those who misuse state
voter records by filing frivolous challenges, harassing voters, violating voter
privacy, or otherwise misusing or misrepresenting election data to maliciously
or fraudulently foment distrust in election outcomes should be fined. Proceeds
from Mississippi’s election data misuse fee could go to the state to recoup costs
to taxpayers the misguided claim engendered, to citizens whose votes were

245 Mississippi Elections Performance Index, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/04/07/2012_election_performance_index_mi
ssissippi.pdf?la=en, archived at http://perma.cc/E4MN-C9YR (“In 2012, the state had the
second-lowest data completeness rate, 72.1%, and was one of only 10 states in which the
rate decreased compared with 2008. The lack of data prevented calculation of Mississippi’s
performance in most areas in the index.”).
246 Presumably such a database might even have assisted election officials during the
election by preventing individuals who had cast ballots in the Democratic primary from
voting in the Republican primary two weeks later.
247 Mississippi does not currently impose sanctions for misuse of election data or
fraudulent or spurious challenges to the eligibility of voters. Indeed, some provisions of
Mississippi’s election code absolve challenges to voter eligibility. E.g., MISS. CODE. ANN.
§ 23-15-17 (West 2012) (“Any person who so notifies an authorized law enforcement officer
[of a false registration] shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and shall be immune
from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.”).
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imperiled, to recoup costs associated with defending voters’ eligibility, or to
state election offices to further improve election data usability and access.
A Mississippi election data misuse penalty would not come without cost. If
we believe that individuals and outside groups should be encouraged to engage
in oversight—particularly in a climate in which investigative journalism
budgets are shot248—and we are convinced that more, not less, oversight would
improve the legitimacy of our elections, imposing fees for misuse might deter
would-be overseers. Even the specter of the cost of defending against
allegations of misuse might prevent well-intentioned overseers from engaging
in important oversight work. Although these concerns are valid, the solution is
not to scrap the idea altogether. Instead Mississippi could calibrate its data
misuse penalties to ensure that they are high enough to do the job but low
enough that they will not squelch oversight efforts. In addition, concerns about
deterrence are minimized since penalties would only be imposed for misuse of
data, not for access.
This recommended set of policies has numerous advantages for Mississippi
and, of course, other states as well. First and foremost, a policy that allows full
and open access to voting information enhances public confidence in
Mississippi’s elections. As more and more voting takes place outside of polling
places (mail-in voting was “brisk” in the Cochran-McDaniel primary),249
increased transparency will serve to satisfy the public of the propriety of
election processes. Voter integrity groups, journalists, and anyone else with the
time and resources to examine voting materials for problems receives full
access to comprehensible election records. Second, these reforms enhance
oversight because they require election officials to make the data more easily
comprehensible, usable, and available. Third, these policies would encourage
users of Mississippi election data to act responsibly and refrain from levying
hasty or poorly-researched accusations. Mississippi would achieve protection
against the effects of loser distortion—only claims backed by credible evidence
would move forward. And finally, these reforms would afford Mississippi
voters a measure of comfort in knowing that their lawful voting status would
not be frivolously challenged or their right of privacy abridged.
The above suggestions acknowledge the danger of too much transparency in
the election context. But they also harness the promise of technology and
increased interest in election oversight to heal wounded public confidence in
election outcomes. Adapting election transparency to changed circumstances
requires creative approaches that encourage broad oversight of elections and
limits the harms of too much transparency.
248 See Lessig, supra note 195 (noting that “[l]ess than 10 percent of large daily
newspapers in America have four investigative journalists or more” and that “40 percent
have no investigative journalists at all.”).
249 Emily Wagster Pettus, Absentee Voting Brisk in Several Miss. Counties, CLARIONLEDGER (June 22, 2014, 9:27 PM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/06/
22/absentee-voting-brisk-several-miss-counties/11249801/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/P376-D5H3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is the responsibility of government to react to changed circumstances.
Election transparency rules in this country are based on dated assumptions and
significantly changed realities concerning how Americans vote, how modern
information architecture operates, and how election oversight is conducted.
Responding to these challenges, state election transparency statutes must set
clear, predetermined rules for election oversight. When rules that govern
elections are vague, outdated, or nonexistent the integrity of our election system
is most in peril. Furthermore, states must recognize that efforts to limit access to
election materials disserve transparency’s primary goal of legitimizing election
outcomes. Policy makers must understand that they are not constrained to a
light switch approach to transparency—either all on or all off. User interfaces
both for voters and for overseers can be improved to prevent data errors and
misuse, to better contextualize information, and to protect voter privacy. And
finally, carefully calibrated deterrence measures can be implemented to ensure
that the negative impacts of election transparency are minimized. In the end,
taking the time to address transparency in elections and adapt policies to
changed circumstances will improve not only the legitimacy of our elections but
the quality of our democracy.

